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FOREWORD
The subject of Islamic State extremist fighters
returning to Western countries or laterally transferring
to other global insurgent battlefields has increasingly
come into international security and US defense policy
discussions. Concerns from such discussions are
derived from the territorial demise of the caliphate in
December 2017 and the potentially large numbers of
extremist fighters and their family members estimated
to still reside in Islamic State enclaves in Syria and
Iraq. Veteran fighters migrating back to their countries
of origin in the West to engage in terrorist actions or
to support insurgent operations in Africa or Central
and Southeast Asia present a new phase in one
component of the ongoing war with radical Sunni
Islamist extremism.
This monograph by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and
Dr. Alma Keshavarz examines the important subject
of extremist fighter migration by first providing an
overview of the Islamic State’s pedigree along with its
precaliphate and transcaliphate territorial strategies,
postcaliphate strategic potential, and demographic
information. These discussions are followed by
problem identification related to returning extremist
fighters, inflows into Syria and Iraq, outflows to the
United States and new battlefields overseas, and the
special case of women and children.
The final component of the monograph provides a
suite of counterbattlefield migration policy response
options for United States Central Command to
consider. Countermigration policies—focusing on
the extremist fighters themselves and organizational
components of the Islamic State—are then introduced
and discussed. Finally, the need for these policy
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responses to deconflict with greater US foreign policy
imperatives in Syria and Iraq is emphasized, along
with four Joint Force–focused recommendations.
This work provides grounded policies with which
to combat the contemporary challenge of extremist
fighter migration and highlights the ongoing relevance
of Strategic Studies Institute publications to the
changing twenty-first-century security environment
that we, as citizens of our nation and representatives
of our nation’s Army, are facing.

DR. CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
June 2014 to December 2017 represented the high
tide of radical Islamist (Salafi-jihadist) territorial
control under the authority of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria. Primarily battle-hardened, many
fighters remain situated within the various enclaves
still controlled by that hybrid terrorist-insurgent
entity. This monograph analyzes and provides policy
response options for US national security and Army
planners concerning the potential for postterritorial
caliphate battlefield migration by this still-sizable
contingent of Islamic State foreign fighters. The
monograph achieves these ends by
1. discussing Islamic State territorial eras and
demographics;
2. offering an overview of the initial inflows of these
fighters into the territorial caliphate, outflows to
the United States, and lateral transfers to new
battlefields, as well as mentioning special issues
related to Islamic State women and children;
3. highlighting and analyzing the four strategic
options available to the Islamic State in its
postterritorial caliphate phase; and
4. offering senior US policy makers and planners
options for counterbattlefield migration policy
responses.
Islamic State strategic options encompass
1. reestablishing the caliphate;
2. accepting loss of territorial control and going
to ground;
3. launching a new wave of jihad against the West
(and Russia); and
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4. creating microcaliphates for global insurgency
purposes, which is the most viable long-term
approach for the group.
In turn, planning options are presented which
pertain to response policies focused on extremists and
the Islamic State as an organization and embedded
within the context of higher-level US foreign policies
toward Syria and Iraq. Additionally, recommendations
for counterforeign terrorist fighter programs and the
Joint Force are provided.
We should be cognizant—from a methodological
perspective—that one of the ongoing issues plaguing
analysis of the potential for lateral battlefield transfer
by Islamic State foreign fighters—including their
opening up of new battlefields in Europe and, to a far
lesser extent, the United States—is the discrepancies,
gaps, and inconsistencies inherent in data and
estimates on the actual number of foreign fighters, both
in the past and the present. To help alleviate part of
this uncertainty, the monograph develops a qualitative
schema to place the foreign fighter threat into context.
This schema incorporates extremist type, commitment,
and location conditionals to assign a threat ranking
to foreign fighters and their families. Although this
schema is an imperfect solution, the robust future
development of such a continuum of threats—though
outside the scope of this research—would further
benefit US policy responses as well as the activities of
counterforeign terrorist fighter programs.
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A POLICY RESPONSE TO ISLAMIC STATE
EXTREMIST FIGHTER BATTLEFIELD
MIGRATION
INTRODUCTION
The demise of the core territorial Islamic State, the
caliphate established in late June 2014 that eventually
consisted of individual provinces spanning over
17,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq with nearly
8 million people under its mandate, is considered a
positive achievement in contemporary international
relations.1 This radical Islamist Sunni protostate, the
extremist origins of which trace back to its al-Qaeda
linkages in 1999 as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
in Afghanistan, openly advocated torture, slavery,
sectarian cleansing, and a host of other activities held
anathema to liberal-democratic values. Ultimately, the
territorial victory over the Islamic State was secured
by an uneasy alliance of competing state and nonstate
entities which could, at the very least, agree that the
caliphate represented an existential threat to their
collective regional interests.2
1. “Sunni Rebels Declare New ‘Islamic Caliphate,’”
Al Jazeera, June 30, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com
/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic
-caliphate-201462917326669749.html; and Paul D. Shinkman,
“ISIS by the Numbers in 2017,” US News & World Report,
December 27, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/world
/articles/2017-12-27/isis-by-the-numbers-in-2017.
2. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng,
“Foreword: The Islamic State’s Growth and Misrule, and the
Future of Violent Non-State Actors,” in Global Radical Islamist
Insurgency: Al Qaeda and Islamic State Networks Focus: A Small
Wars Journal Anthology, ed. Dave Dilegge and Robert J. Bunker
(Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2016), 2: xxviii–xxix.
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The second-order effects related to the decline and
eventual fall of the caliphate at the hands of so many
competing—and, at times, openly belligerent—entities
focus on the migration potential of foreign fighters—
typically male, but in some instances, female—and
familial extremists out of Syria and Iraq. Such potential
stems from Islamic State extremists either migrating
from the core Islamic State battlefield to another one
in a different part of the world or returning to their
country of origin to open it up as a new front as part
of the global radical Islamist insurgency.3 This global
insurgency is based in radical Sunni Islam (Salafi
jihadism) and has its origins in Osama bin Laden’s
declaration of jihad against the United States and Saudi
Arabia in 1996, followed by the paradigm-shifting
attack on the World Trade Center towers and the
Pentagon in 2001.4 Since the emergence of the Islamic
State and the development of a schism between the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
(the second al-Baghdadi) of the Islamic State and
Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda struggled over the

3. This issue is recognized within the US Army War College
(USAWC) KSIL as “3.b.6 Assess options for preventing extremists
from leaving one battlefield in one part of the world to join another
in a different part of the world. (Extremist migration).” Charles A.
Carlton, ed., Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) 2018–2020 (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC Press, 2018), 16.
4. For the original declaration in Arabic and an English
translation, see Al-Qaeda, “Declaration of Jihad against the
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites,” reference
no. AFGP-2002-003676, n.d., https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony
-program/declaration-of-jihad-against-the-americans
-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original
-language-2/.
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establishment of the caliphate—this insurgency has
morphed into a dual organizational threat.5
Within this global insurgency context, the
immediate imperative for US national security and
Army planners vis-à-vis a postterritorial caliphate is to
address the battlefield migration potential of a sizable
contingent of battle-hardened Islamic State foreign
fighters situated within various remaining enclaves in
Syria and Iraq.6 Derived from the Army’s Key Strategic
Issues List (KSIL) and seeking recommendations
for counterextremist migration policy to be applied
against these foreign fighters and their familial
relations, the following research approach will be

5. For basic time frames, see Zack Beauchamp, “The Syrian
War: A History,” Vox, September 21, 2015, https://www.vox
.com/cards/syrian-refugees-war-assad/isis-founded. For a more
in-depth analysis, see Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State:
ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (New York: Verso, 2015); and
Ali Soufan, Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of bin Laden to the
Rise of the Islamic State (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2017). The global disposition of the major al-Qaeda and Islamic
State enclaves and their affiliated groups can be viewed in Figure
2, “Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Violent Activity, 2016–2018,” in
Seth G. Jones, America’s Counterterrorism Gamble (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], July
26, 2018), 4. For a perspective on the competing al-Qaeda and
Islamic State strategic approaches, see table 13, “Al-Qaeda and
Islamic State Strategic Approaches,” in Robert J. Bunker and
Pamela Ligouri Bunker, Radical Islamist English-Language Online
Magazines: Research Guide, Strategic Insights, and Policy Response
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC Press, 2018),
130–31.
6. Bethan McKernan, “Up to 30,000 ISIS Fighters Remain in
Iraq and Syria, Says UN,” Independent, August 15, 2018, https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis
-fighters-iraq-syria-un-report-jihadis-raqqa-iraq-a8492736.html.
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undertaken to identify these recommendations.7 First,
we provide an overview of the past Islamic State
territorial strategies and identify present and future
strategic options for this severely battered but not-yetdefeated entity, as well as supply basic demographic
information. Second, we identify problems related to:
(1) inflows into and outflows out of Syria and Iraq; and
(2) women and children in the caliphate, with émigré
number estimates given where applicable. Third, we
survey the postcaliphate geopolitical situation visà-vis how it will influence the Islamic State’s present
strategic options and discuss the most likely courses
of action (COAs). Finally, we recommend a suite of
battlefield migration policy options to better contain
the Islamic State threat within Syria and Iraq and
prohibit foreign fighter veterans from traveling to
new global battlefields or back to their host countries
to engage in potential terrorist actions. These
policy options benefit from multiple counterforeign
terrorist fighter (counter-FTF) programs and Joint

7. Carlton, Key Strategic Issues List. Although not stated
explicitly in the KSIL, Islamic State fighters migrating back to
the United States or Europe would technically be joining another
battlefield. Such a perspective is in line with official Islamic State
communiqués provided in the Rumiyah online magazine series
and by the Amaq News Agency in the Islamic State’s social
media. Although Rumiyah ceased publication in November 2017
with the loss of Islamic State sanctuaries in Syria, the Amaq News
Agency was still releasing short videos and issuing statements
as of August 2018. See, for example, Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic
State Video Purportedly Shows Youths Responsible for Attacks in
Chechnya,” FDD’s Long War Journal, August 21, 2018, https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/islamic-state
-video-purportedly-shows-youths-responsible-for-attacks-in
-chechnya.php.
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Force recommendations related to the global radical
Islamist threat.
ISLAMIC STATE TERRITORIAL ERAS AND
DEMOGRAPHICS
The origins of the Islamic State trace back through
a lineage of groups initially entwined with the street
philosophy and activities of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
the ruthless Jordanian firebrand known for his
sectarian attacks inflicted upon Shia populations and
his videotaped and widely publicized beheading of
American contractor Nicholas Berg in May 2004.8
Under Zarqawi’s leadership, the organization was
known as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad from 1999
through 2004 while in Afghanistan and, later, al-Qaeda
in the Land of Two Rivers (more popularly known
as al-Qaeda in Iraq) from 2004 into 2006, after he
redeployed it to that field of battle. The Majlis Shura
al-Mujahideen is also noted as having existed for a
brief period as part of this lineage.9 After Zarqawi’s
death in June 2006, the new al-Qaeda in Iraq leader,
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, pledged allegiance to Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi (the first al-Baghdadi), the leader
of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), resulting in al-Qaeda
8. For an early history and psychological insights related
to Zarqawi, see Jason M. Breslow, “Nada Bakos: How Zarqawi
Went from ‘Thug’ to ISIS Founder,” PBS, May 17, 2016,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/nada-bakos
-how-zarqawi-went-from-thug-to-isis-founder/.
9. See Aaron Y. Zelin, The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for
Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement, Research Notes no. 20
(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
June 2014), 1. This group has alternatively been called “Majlis
Shura al-Mujahideen fi al-Iraq” (Mujahideen Shura Council in
Iraq). See Mahan Abedin, “Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq:
Fact or Fiction?,” Terrorism Focus 3, no. 12 (March 28, 2006).
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in Iraq becoming ISI’s affiliate.10 During this period,
the ISI focused its territorial expansion within Al
Anbar Province, Iraq. In reaction to the ISI’s extreme
policies, its forces were defeated by tribal and
community elements in the fall of 2006 through the
summer of 2007; this event later came to be known as
the “Anbar Awakening.”11 The ISI, still entrenched in
enclaves within the western regions of the country,
then went through a period of crisis and rebuilding.
With the death of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (the first
al-Baghdadi) in April 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the
second al-Baghdadi) became the new leader of the
organization a month later.12
With about 80 percent of ISI leadership either killed
or captured by mid-2010, the second al-Baghdadi
brought many formerly imprisoned Iraqi intelligence
and military officers into the leadership of the
organization to help replenish its ranks.13 With the
10. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda,” 1–4.
11. Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, ed.,
Al-Anbar Awakening (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University
Press, 2009), 2:13.
12. Anthony Shadid, “Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New
Leaders,” New York Times, May 16, 2015, https://atwar.blogs
.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new
-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
13. “US Says 80% of al-Qaeda Leaders in Iraq
Removed,” BBC News, June 4, 2010, https://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/10243585; and Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand behind
the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” Washington
Post, April 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state
-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4
-8730-4f473416e759_story.html; and Isabel Coles and Ned Parker,
“How Saddam’s Men Help Islamic State Rule,” Reuters, December
11, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report
/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/.
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advent of the Syrian civil war in early 2011, the ISI
sent many extremist fighters into Syria by August of
that year to exploit the increasing absence of central
authority. From late 2010 into early 2013, the ISI
was able to restructure and reconstitute itself into
its contemporary Islamic State form, and this was
further facilitated by the final US troop withdrawals
in late 2011.14 Although the Syrian civil war initially
precipitated the influx of foreign fighters into the
region with the intent to aid those affected by the
Assad regime, between 2013 and 2014 a large group
of these foreign fighters migrated into Syria and Iraq
to fight for the Islamic State. From April 2013 on,
with increasing Islamic State victories and the group
further dissociating itself from al-Qaeda, three Islamic
State territorial eras have been identified, along with
an emergent one.

14. Security debates exist related to the US troop withdrawal
and the ensuing Shia-dominated Iraqi government policies of
Nuri al-Maliki that estranged the Sunni populace in the central
and western regions of the country. See Alice Fordham, “Fact
Check: Did Obama Withdraw from Iraq Too Soon, Allowing
ISIS to Grow?,” NPR, December 19, 2015, https://www.npr
.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw
-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow.
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Table 1. Islamic State territorial strategies
PHASE

STRATEGY

TIME
PERIOD

EXAMPLES

1. Precaliphate

•Initial territorial
acquisition
• Terrorism
• Insurgency
•H
 ijrah (emigration)
to Syria

April 2013 to
May 2014

• Large foreign fighter
influx into Syria
(2013–14)
• Growing Islamic State
enclaves in Syria and
Iraq
•E
 arly Black Flags/
related e-books

2. Caliphate
(Rise and
Expansion)

•B
 aqiya wa tatamaddad
(remaining and
expanding)15
•H
 ijrah (emigration) to
Syria and Iraq
•G
 hanimah (war booty)
to expand

June 2014 to
July 2016

• Repeated calls for
foreign fighters to
travel to the caliphate
(actual fighter
migration out in
2015–16)
• Capture of Mosul;
caliphate declared
• Dabiq online
magazine

3. Caliphate
(Decline and
Fall)

• J ihad fard ‘ayn
(defensive holy war)
in Iraq and Syria
• Jihad (holy war)
against “the Romans”
•H
 ijrah (emigration) to
the Philippines/other
areas

August 2016
to November
2017

• Foreign fighter
migration in/out
frozen
•Loss of Mosul and
Al-Raqqah; territorial
demise
• Rumiyah online
magazine

4. Postcaliphate

• Terrorism and
insurgency via
remnant enclaves
• Jihad (holy war)
against “the Romans”
• New Wilayat
(provinces)/
microcaliphate
creation

December
2017 to
present

• Foreign fighter
battlefield migration
potential unknown
•B
 ay’ah (oath of
allegiance) to leaders
of groups still exist
• No digital magazines
or e-books/localized
narratives

Precaliphate
This era spanned roughly April 2013 through
May 2014, just before the founding of the caliphate.
The Islamic State capitalized on the political chaos
15. See Cameron Glenn et al., “Timeline: The Rise, Spread,
and Fall of the Islamic State,” updated October 28, 2019, https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and
-fall-the-islamic-state. See also International Crisis Group, Facing
the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (Brussels:
International Crisis Group, May 16, 2019).
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of the Syrian civil war—including material support
from foreign patrons seeking to overthrow the
Assad regime—as well as weak state capacity in
Iraq, magnified by sectarian political infighting.
This territorial acquisition phase was derived from
a combination of insurgency supported by acts of
terrorism in which parallel governance—and, later,
political and religious primacy—was established in a
patchwork of Islamic State enclaves that, over time,
began to merge toward one another. The Islamic State
began to stress emigration by means of social media
and videos, coupled with early e-books such as the
Shuhada and the Black Flags series and the initial IS
News and IS Reports.
By the beginning of 2013, global country estimates
indicated a steady stream of fighters was flowing into
the Syrian-Iraqi conflict zone.16 Characteristically,
large numbers of foreign fighters arrived principally
in Syria and were trained and outfitted to engage in
operations there, or they laterally migrated into Iraq
to support the enlargement of Islamic State enclaves
in that country. A 2013 International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation report estimated that between
2011 and early 2013, Europeans represented about
“7–11 percent of the total foreign fighter population
of between 2,000 and 5,500 persons.”17 The latter half
of 2013, however, drew in larger numbers of fighters,
16. The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated
Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (New
York: The Soufan Group, December 2015).
17. Edwin Bakker and Mark Singleton, “Foreign Fighters
in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of
a Rapidly Growing Phenomenon,” in Foreign Fighters under
International Law and Beyond, ed. Andrea de Guttry, Francesca
Capone, and Christoph Paulussen (New York: Springer, February
2016), 14.

9

particularly from Europe. A 2014 Brookings report
by Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro indicates
“this period witnessed the fastest mobilization of
foreign fighters in the history of the modern jihadist
movement.”18 The International Centre for the Study
of Radicalisation report further estimated that by midDecember 2013, “there were up to 11,000 fighters from
more than 70 countries that had joined the struggle in
Syria against President Bashar al-Assad.”19
Toward the latter end of this period, as the enclaves
began to merge into a territorial entity, families began
to join the men who had gone before. Available
information on foreign fighters from Germany,
Belgium, and the Netherlands is illustrative in this
regard. Antwerp and Brussels were known to have
“clusters of likeminded militants” who were “drawn
into the orbit of radical preachers who encouraged
and facilitated their travel to fight jihad early on in
the Syrian civil war.”20 Moreover, Belgium had a large
population of North African Arab Muslims, an easily
targeted demographic for Islamic State recruitment.
As in Belgium, a large number of women are said to
have left the Netherlands for Syria and Iraq in 2013
and 2014 when the group called on women to “join

18. Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid, Be a Little
Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in
Syria and Iraq, Policy Paper no. 34 (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, November 2014).
19. Bakker and Singleton, “Foreign Fighters,” 14.
20. Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Belgian Radical Networks and the
Road to the Brussels Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 6 (June 2016): 7.
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their husbands who had traveled there.”21 Most Dutch
émigrés are recorded to have returned before 2014,
the majority of them being women. Further, some
Dutch women who traveled abroad became pregnant,
“making it difficult to verify how many children [had
been] born in the conflict area,” particularly during
this early period.22
Caliphate (Rise and Expansion)
From June 2014 through July 2016, the newly
established caliphate was in its ascendancy. The
territorial strategy expressed by the Islamic State
during this era was derived from baqiya wa tatamaddad
(remaining and expanding) and supported by the
taking of ghanimah (war booty)—literally billions of
dollars’ worth of military equipment—to provide
the Islamic State with a conventional ground combat
capability. This rapid territorial expansion was
witnessed following the capture of large Iraqi military
stockpiles in cities such as Mosul (June 2014) and
Ramadi (May 2015). The stockpiles provided the
Islamic State with about three to four Iraqi Army
divisions’ worth of equipment and materiel, which
allowed the group’s extremist fighters to overrun
defending Iraqi governmental and Syrian regime
forces in outposts, towns, and cities throughout the
21. Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet, “From the Kingdom
to the Caliphate and Back,” in Returnees: Who Are They, Why
Are They (Not) Coming Back and How Should We Deal with Them?
Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands, ed. Renard and Coolsaet, Egmont
Paper 101 (Brussels: Egmont Institute, February 2018), 5.
22. General Intelligence and Security Service, Jihadist Women,
a Threat Not to Be Underestimated (The Hague: General Intelligence
and Security Service, November 2017), 6–7.
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region and add their captured military equipment to
the group’s growing military arsenal.23
The initial Islamic State online magazine Dabiq
and supporting social media further promoted
emigration to the lands of the caliphate in Syria and
Iraq, particularly by those Muslims living in the
West. Fighters and their families continued to arrive.
A 2018 Combating Terrorism Center report analyzed
documents retrieved from Islamic State-held territory
and reported “1,100 women [had] registered in a
guesthouse logbook operated by [the Islamic State]
(assumed to be between 2014 and 2016).”24 The
average age of female travelers was 29; 77 percent
were married (compared to 30 percent of men), and 10
23. The initial estimate of three divisions’ worth of materiel
is attributed to Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, in a 2014 Wall
Street Journal interview. See Matt Bradley, “Insurgents in Iraq
Seizing Advanced Weaponry,” Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2014,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/insurgents-in-iraq-seizing
-advanced-weaponry-1404684313, quoted in Jeremy Bender,
“As ISIS Routs the Iraqi Army, Here’s a Look at What the
Jihadists Have in Their Arsenal,” Business Insider, July 8, 2014,
https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-military-equipment
-breakdown-2014-7. This estimate was increased to possibly four
divisions worth of materiel the following year. See Chris Lo,
“Friendly Fire: Accounting for the Stolen Arsenal of ISIS,” Army
Technology, February 1, 2016, https://www.army-technology
.com/features/featurefriendly-fire-accounting-for-the-stolen
-arsenal-of-isis-4789324/.
24. Daniel Milton and Brian Dodwell, “Jihadi Brides?
Examining a Female Guesthouse Registry from the Islamic State’s
Caliphate,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 5 (2018). See also Joana Cook
and Gina Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and
Minors of Islamic State (London: International Centre for the Study
of Radicalisation, King’s College London, July 2018), https://icsr
.info/2018/07/23/from-daesh-to-diaspora-tracing-the-women
-and-minors-of-islamic-state/.
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percent were single (compared to 61 percent of men).25
Islamic State propaganda appealed to both genders
by offering a life of financial stability, health care and
education, community support, independence, and
adventure. Although a significantly large number
of women have traveled voluntarily, some were
“likely coerced and, in some cases, forced to travel.”26
Women who were actively involved often recruited
other women, spread Islamic State propaganda, and
fundraised for the group.
Until 2015, experts believed more than 200 young
women and teenage girls had traveled to join the
Islamic State from Europe. The majority were from
France (60), followed by the United Kingdom (50),
Germany (40), Belgium (35), and Austria (14).27 An
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)
report from 2016 indicated that 17 percent of “the total
European contingent” were female foreign fighters.28
European women traveling to the conflict zone often
married an Islamic State member online before their
arrival; others were married just as they arrived.
Women were also believed to be indoctrinating their
children with jihadist ideology.29
Émigrés came from other parts of the world,
including parts of Asia and even North America,
although in smaller numbers. Such foreign fighter
travel continued through most of 2014, but reversed
itself in 2015, decreasing steadily through 2016.
25. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 23–24.
26. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 26.
27. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 26.
28. Tanya Mehra, Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics
and Policy Responses (The Hague: ICCT, December 2016), 11.
29. Renard and Coolsaet, “From the Kingdom to the
Caliphate,” 22.
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This reversal resulted from a secondary outflow of
migration from the caliphate stemming from the
primitive living conditions that existed there and the
increasing US and allied air strikes taking place at that
time. Many foreign fighters returned to their countries
of origin beginning in 2015, with the highest numbers
returning in mid-2015. Some returned “disillusioned
and frustrated with their situation”; others returned
because of “calls by family and friends.”30
The 2018 annual Department of State country
reports on terrorism referred to Turkey as a “source
and transit country for FTFs seeking to join [the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)] and other terrorist groups
fighting in Syria and Iraq.”31 Because many foreign
fighters used Turkey as the gateway to the conflict
zone, Turkey “established risk analysis units at airports
and border crossing points and had a comprehensive
no-entry list in place.”32 This perspective on Turkey
interdicting Islamic State foreign fighter inflows and
outflows, though, can be contrasted to earlier—and
still legitimate—allegations that it allowed Islamic
State fighters into Syria in 2015 to fight the Kurds and
use Turkish regions as logistics bases.33 Still, since
mid-2015, the number of individuals from the United
States traveling to or attempting to travel to the conflict
zone declined, which officials believe resulted from
“Turkey’s increased border security, deterrence from
arrests in the United States, ISIS’s encouragement that
30. Daniel H. Heinke and Jan Raudszus, “Germany’s
Returning Foreign Fighters and What to Do about Them,” in
Renard and Coolsaet, Returnees, 44.
31. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2018 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, October 2019).
32. Mehra, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 6.
33. See Daniel Byman, “How States Exploit Jihadist Foreign
Fighters,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 12 (2018): 4–5.
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supporters commit attacks at home, and the group’s
ongoing battlefield losses.”34 Still, these numbers were
never above the low hundreds.
Caliphate (Decline and Fall)
The territorial ISIS promoted itself as engaging
in a defensive holy war on all fronts from August
2016 through November 2017. A major loss to the
caliphate was the conquest of Mosul in June 2017 by
a US-backed coalition of Iraqi governmental units,
Kurds, and Shia fighters.35 This conquest was followed
by increasing manpower, materiel, and geographic
losses by the Islamic State, culminating in its last
strongholds and capital being overwhelmed over the
ensuing months. As the Islamic State lost territory,
Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the country captured a
large number of its women and minors. By September
2017, approximately 1,400 women and children of
“presumed [Islamic State] fighters were held in a camp
south of Mosul, according to media reports relying
on sources in Iraqi intelligence”; this figure included
European nationals.36
The number of jihadists attracted to the Islamic
State was also in significant decline. In 2017, the US
34. Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, “Reference
Aid: US Foreign Fighters,” September 2017, https://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Foreign%20Fighters
_CVE%20Task%20Force_Final.pdf.
35. Isabel Coles and Stephen Kalin, “Iraqi PM Declares
Victory over Islamic State in Mosul,” Reuters, July 10, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq
-mosul/iraqi-pm-declares-victory-over-islamic-state-in-mosul
-idUSKBN19V105.
36. EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL),
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018
(The Hague: EUROPOL, 2018), 36.
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intelligence community indicated “the number of
foreign fighters crossing the border from Turkey
fell from 2,000 each month [in 2015] to about 50 in
September 2016.”37 Turkey seemingly did its part to
prevent the further flow of migration into Syria and
Iraq and stop foreign fighters attempting to return
to their countries of origin. Because the Islamic State
faced a series of defeats in Iraq and Syria, the number
of foreign fighter returnees was also low in 2017.38
For example, when returnees began to be recorded
in Belgium between 2013 and 2015, the numbers
indicated the flow of returnees had slowed in 2016
and 2017, when only a few families with children
returned.39
The International Criminal Police Organisation
(INTERPOL) established a database that continues
to keep track of foreign fighter travelers and that has
further facilitated states’ efforts to prevent the fighters’
migration from the Islamic State. This database
comprises 7,500 records. The number of names
and countries of origin in the database continued to
rise well into 2017.40 Law enforcement agencies in
numerous countries have in large part cooperated to
contain the threat of foreign fighter returnees via UN
37. Alastair Reed, Johanna Pohl, and Marjolein Jegerings,
The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of
an Evolving Phenomenon (The Hague: ICCT, June 2017), 4. See also
Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters, 10.
38. EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2018, 6.
39. Renard and Coolsaet, “From the Kingdom to the
Caliphate,” 21.
40. Renard and Coolsaet, “From the Kingdom to the
Caliphate,” 21. See also “INTERPOL Joins Global Coalition
to Counter ISIL,” INTERPOL, July 22, 2016, https://
www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2016
/INTERPOL-joins-Global-Coalition-to-Counter-ISIL.
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and other internationally sponsored programs. Many
states, such as Austria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium,
Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
have enacted new laws that prevent foreign fighters
from returning by revoking their citizenship, and in a
host of other states, returnees from Syria and Iraq are
subject to severe criminal penalties.41
As the caliphate was in its twilight during this era,
jihad (holy war) against the unbelievers in the West
was increasingly being advocated in its new online
magazine Rumiyah. Rumiyah replaced Dabiq (the
namesake town of which had been lost) and introduced
its Just Terror Tactics series, similar to the Open Source
Jihad series in Inspire, the earlier al-Qaeda online
magazine. The concept of hijrah (emigration) also was
broadened in Islamic State propaganda to include the
encouragement of relocation to new provinces, such
as in the Philippines. Notably, foreign fighter and
family inflows and outflows related to Syria and Iraq
during the latter part of this era dropped to a trickle
as the access points became less permeable. Turkey
reportedly deported 3,500 individuals suspected of
being foreign fighters in July 2016 and denied entry to
another 2,200 over the course of 18 months.42 At the
same time, the tendency of extremist fighters to stand
their ground and die in the defense of the caliphate
during this period rather than withdraw from the

41. Human Rights Watch, “‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ Laws:
Human Rights Rollbacks under UN Security Council Resolution
2178” (white paper, Human Rights Watch, December 2016), 14.
42. Mehra, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 6.
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battle or to their home countries also limited battlefield
migration levels.43
Postcaliphate
Following the fall of Al-Raqqah in December
2017 and Syria in October and the Iraqi declaration
of victory over the Islamic State two months later
was a period of strategic and territorial uncertainty
for the remnants of the caliphate.44 Potential exists
for the Islamic State to revert back to its precaliphate
condition of the 2013 era in which its remaining
fighters (and their families) simply went underground
in Syria and Iraq and reverted back to terrorism and
insurgency operations.45
Another potential is for lateral battlefield
migrations to take place either nearby—to reinforce
Islamic State groups in Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, or
Saudi Arabia—or farther afield in such locales as East
Africa, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, or the East Indies,
where microcaliphates are attempting to emerge.
The third potential, and the greatest concern for the
United States and its Western allies, is those extremist
fighters originating from the West will migrate back
home and take the jihad philosophy to heart by
43. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate,
The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters:
Research Perspectives (New York: Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate, March 2018), 3.
44. Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Aboulenein, “Iraq Declares
Final Victory over Islamic State,” Reuters, December 9, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis
-iraq-islamicstate/iraq-declares-final-victory-over-islamic-state
-idUSKBN1E30B9.
45. For thoughts on this option, see Thomas R. McCabe, “The
Islamic State after the Caliphate—Can IS Go Underground?,”
Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 4 (August 2017): 95–101.
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standing up operational cells and conducting increased
attacks against the countries’ civilian populations.
Such attacks could take place independently of, or in
tandem with, Islamic State lone-wolf attacks. Quite
possibly, all three postcaliphate strategic reorientations
will initially exist simultaneously. The potential
viability of some of these strategic approaches will
be dependent on the extremist fighter and familial
demographics and the contemporary postcaliphate
geopolitical situation in which the Islamic State has
now found itself.
Although a fourth potential, Islamic State and
al-Qaeda rapprochement, has been discussed in some
international security circles, this possibility is not
viewed as viable at present. Although affiliate group
defection has continued from time to time, the two
organizations’ ideological perspectives on relations
with Shia populations, practices such as beheadings,
leadership bound by feudal-like alliance structures
down to their chieftains and war leaders, and other
issues have increasingly differed. A rapprochement
could theoretically take place if the top Islamic State
or al-Qaeda leadership were eliminated. In such
an instance, all the bay’ahs (alliances) holding the
organization together would be nullified because they
exist at an individual fealty (vassal to lord) level.46
The Islamic State has largely been pushed out of
large expanses of Syria and Iraq, but, at the same time,
46. For differing perspectives on Islamic State and
al-Qaeda relations, see Scott Stewart, “Can the Islamic State and
al Qaeda Find Common Ground?,” Stratfor Worldview, March
9, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/can-islamic
-state-and-al-qaeda-find-common-ground; and Bruce Hoffman,
“The Coming ISIS–al Qaeda Merger,” Foreign Affairs, March
29, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-29
/coming-isis-al-qaeda-merger.
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pockets of fighters remain in the two countries, as does
the threat of returning foreign fighters. According
to the UN’s July 2018 report on the Islamic State, the
current total number of Islamic State membership
in Syria and Iraq is estimated to be between 20,000
and 30,000.47 The Department of Defense has not
commented on the accuracy of these new numbers,
nor has any official provided further estimates. A
lot of uncertainty exists, leaving no way to validate
the accuracy of these numbers, so they should be
considered only generalizations related to present
Islamic State fighter strength.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
To better understand the concerns related to
extremist fighter migration coming out of Syria and
Iraq, this section provides an overview of the initial
inflows of these fighters into the territorial caliphate,
outflows to the United States, and lateral transfers to
new battlefields, and highlights special issues related
to Islamic State women and children. Domestic
concerns focusing on Islamic State fighters migrating
back to the United States are minimal, with the real
concern being that of lateral battlefield transfers to

47. UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida
and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2018/705 (New York:
UN Security Council, July 2018), 3, https://www.un.org
/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/705&referer=/
english/&Lang=E.
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Islamic State provinces as well as very real returning
fighter terrorism-based threats to our European allies.48
Inflows (Émigrés) to Syria and Iraq
Estimates of the total number of foreign fighters
who have traveled to Syria and Iraq since the start of
the conflict mostly range between 27,000 and 31,000;
other estimates go as high as 40,000.49 An International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation report from
July 2018 used a dataset from April 2013 and June
2018 from official government sources and figures on
foreign fighters, and, in cases where such data was
not available, the authors used academic, institutional
publications and media reports.50 The authors estimate
that, over the 5-year period, a total of 41,490 foreign
fighters emigrated to the caliphate from 80 different
countries. Figure 1 shows estimates of the foreign
fighter breakdown by region.51

48. Even though this threat to the US homeland—along with
foreign national-derived terrorist threats—is relatively minor, it
is still considered significant enough that various barrier-to-entry
programs have gone into effect. See, for instance, Exec. Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
49. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., The Travelers:
American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq (Washington, DC: Program on
Extremism, February 2018), 5. See also Zack Fellman et al., Fallout:
The Future of Foreign Fighters (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2017), 6.
50. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 11.
51. All data are estimates derived from Cook and Vale, From
Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 14–15.
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Figure 1. Foreign fighters by region, 2013–18
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Most foreign fighter travel occurred through
Turkey because of its border with Syria and “visa-free
travel agreements with more than 69 governments,
which limit the requirement for traveler screening.”
In addition, “no visas are required for most EU
citizens, some of whom are also able to travel on
identity cards.”52 Other Europeans traveled through
the Balkan states, the Caucasus, and then Iran, Russia,
or Georgia into Turkey.53 Turkey recorded 53,781
individuals “who were feared to [have attempted]
to join the fight in Syria and Iraq” from information
provided from 146 states.54 Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and
Morocco are noteworthy because of high numbers of
52. Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent
Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror, 114th Cong.
(2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, director of
the National Counterterrorism Center).
53. Countering Violent Islamist Extremism (statement of
Rasmussen).
54. Mustafa Gurbuz, “The Many Complications of
Returning Islamic State Fighters,” March 19, 2018, http://
arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/the-many-complications
-of-returning-islamic-state-fighters/.
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failed attempts by citizens seeking to join the Islamic
State in Syria and Iraq. Tunisian authorities stopped
over 12,000 individuals and placed a further 4,605
Tunisians on the country’s watch list. More than 7,000
Saudi Arabians and nearly 3,000 Moroccan citizens
were stopped by Turkish security elements.55 Thus,
although the number of foreign fighters who traveled
to the territorial caliphate is significant, the actual
numbers could have been even larger.
Outflows (Returnees) to the United States
The number of foreign fighters emigrating to Syria
and Iraq from the United States and their potential
return are a direct national security concern. Unlike
many other countries, the United States has had a
relatively low level of Islamic State radicalization and
recruitment of its citizens for emigration purposes into
the caliphate. Between 5,000 and 7,000 individuals are
said to have traveled to Syria and Iraq between 2011
and 2016 from Europe alone, mostly from France,
Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.56 The
number of Europeans actually fighting in the conflict
zone by late 2017 was estimated to be around 2,500.57
The estimated number of foreign fighter-related
émigrés from the United States, which is quite low
in comparison, ranges from 250 to 300.58 According
to the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force,
“approximately three dozen Americans have died after
55. Gurbuz, “Returning Islamic State Fighters.”
56. Fellman et al., Fallout: The Future of Foreign Fighters; and
Brian Michael Jenkins, “Foreword,” in Meleagrou-Hitchens et al.,
Travelers, x.
57. EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2018, 26.
58. Jenkins, “Foreword,” x.
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traveling to partake in this conflict.”59 Of the returnees
to the United States, some have been arrested and
prosecuted, but the status of others remains unknown.
The average age of individuals leaving the United
States for foreign jihadist fighting purposes was 27. Of
the estimated 250–300 such travelers, 86 percent were
adult males. Thus far, “44 percent are still at large or
their status is publicly unavailable, 19 percent were
apprehended in the US or overseas, 34 percent died
overseas, and 5 percent returned to the US without
facing charges.”60 The states with the highest numbers
of émigrés were Minnesota, Virginia, and Ohio.61 See
table 2 for a breakdown of North American Islamic
State foreign fighter estimates by country (United
States and Canada).62
Table 2. North American Islamic State foreign
fighter estimates, 2014–17
COUNTRY
United States
Canada
TOTALS

TRAVELED
272
90
362

RETURNED / %
40/14.71%
17/18.89%
57/15.74%

Even if some of the estimated 110–32 Islamic
State foreign fighters from the United States who
are unaccounted for return home without being
apprehended, their intent to engage in terrorist
actions is not a certainty. According to a 2017 RAND
study, returnees can be categorized into the following
59. Countering
Violent
Extremism
Task
“Reference Aid.”
60. Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., Travelers, 16.
61. Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., Travelers, 5.
62. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 21.
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Force,

three subgroups: disillusioned, disengaged but not
disillusioned, and operational.63
The disillusioned subgroup traveled to the
conflict zone in search of “utopia, adventure, and a
pure expression of religious identity, but they found
something far different.”64 This subgroup experienced
harsh living conditions with very little food and
money, psychological pressure from witnessing the
trauma of the conflict, and a general lack of respect
from locals. When this subgroup returned to its
country of origin, potentially “these individuals
[could] mentor other radicalized youth.”65
The second subgroup is not as disillusioned as the
first; rather, it returned primarily for familial reasons.
Although these individuals have grown weary of
war and its deprivations, they are “still committed
to jihadism.”66
The operational subgroup are individuals who
want to create their own network of jihadists by
recruiting new members to conduct attacks in
their home countries to open up new Islamic State
battlefields. As indicated by the RAND report, “these
individuals are the most dangerous and deadly.”67
So when Islamic State foreign fighters return to the
United States, the skill sets they possess translate into
potentially more lethal attacks. Counterintuitively,
however, such returnee foreign fighters being
63. The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate, 115th
Cong. (2017) (statement of Colin P. Clarke, adjunct senior political
scientist at the RAND Corporation).
64. Terrorist Diaspora, 5.
65. Terrorist Diaspora, 5.
66. Terrorist Diaspora, 5.
67. Terrorist Diaspora, 5.
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involved in a plot or attack also lowers the plot or
attack’s chances for success:
The presence of a returnee decreases the likelihood that an
executed plot will cause mass casualties [based on 1990–
2017 data]. . . . Plots carried out with American returnees
from Islamist insurgencies abroad also decrease the
likelihood that a plot will come to fruition. The presence
of a known foreign fighter increases the likelihood of
detection and disruption by law enforcement officials.68

Given the low numbers of potential Islamic State
fighters returning to the United States, that only a
percentage of them would be operational, and that they
would be monitored by law enforcement, the threat
potential for extremist fighter migration is relatively
low for the United States. To date, extremist fighter
migration is still only a hypothetical threat because
no Islamic State returnees have been involved in any
such attacks. The closest such an attack has come to
taking place was in April 2015 when Abdirahman
Sheik Mohamud—an operative of the Al-Nusrah
Front to Protect the Levant linked to al-Qaeda who
had been sent back to the United States—was arrested
while in the planning stages of an attack that was to
take place in Texas.69 Because of the low numbers
68. Christopher J. Wright, “Sometimes They Come Back:
Responding to American Foreign Fighter Returnees and Other
Elusive Threats,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political
Aggression 12, no. 1 (April 23, 2018): 1.
69. Jeff Seldin, “Study Finds Minimal Short-Term Threat
from US Foreign Fighters,” VOA News, February 6, 2018,
https://www.voanews.com/a/george-washington-university
-study-on-us-travelers/4240809.html; and Andrew Welsh
Huggins, “Man Apologizes, Sentenced to 22 Years for US
Terrorism Plot,” Seattle Times, January 21, 2018, https://
www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/ohio-man-accused
-of-plotting-us-attacks-to-be-sentenced/.
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and close monitoring by law enforcement, concerns
over an Islamic State terrorist diaspora engaging in
attacks domestically are overstated, unlike the threat
facing Europe. But if such a veteran Islamic State
fighter or a group of fighters could make it back into
the United States without being detected, their combat
skills would mean they would be able to engage in a
terrorist attack far deadlier than that of homegrown
extremists who had never traveled overseas to fight
for the caliphate. Such returning foreign fighters
have explosive and firearm skill sets, as opposed
to local extremists who have been exposed to the
Islamic State Just Terror Tactics presented in Rumiyah
online magazine and who focus more on knife and
vehicular attacks.70
Outflows (Laterals) to New Battlefields
Although we know the Islamic State strategically
seeks to send forces into its immediate and more
distant provinces representative of microcaliphate
territories, our actual understanding of this dynamic
is limited:
While we know that [the Islamic State] has established
a presence in Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt, [and]
perhaps elsewhere, such as the Philippines, we have only
fragmentary information on whether these forces are
being reinforced by fighters from Syria and Iraq . . . This
is in part because the internal operations and decisionmaking processes of [the Islamic State] remain opaque,

70. For a discussion of these tactics and attacks linked to
them, see Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, The Islamic
State English-Language Online Magazine Rumiyah (Rome): Research
Guide, Narrative & Threat Analysis and US Policy Response (Reston,
VA: The Terrorism Research Center, August 2019).
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and the status of its leadership and remaining fighters is
largely unknown.71

Still, specific instances of these fighters having engaged
in lateral battlefield migration—from Syria, Iraq, and
other regions—have been reported:
The [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)] core
continues to facilitate the relocation of some of its key
operatives to Afghanistan. One Member State reports
that foreign terrorist fighters who are nationals of Algeria,
France, the Russian Federation, Tunisia and Central
Asian States have recently arrived in Afghanistan, and
that Abu Qutaiba, the ISIL leader in Salah al-Din Province
of Iraq, has reportedly relocated to Badakhshan Province
of Afghanistan.72
These strategic shifts had been duly communicated to
ISIS-affiliated terrorists and supporters in the region. In
recent weeks, online Daesh sympathizers have begun
popularizing the terms Wilayah al-Filibin and Wilayah
Asia Timur (Malay: East Asia Province) using them
interchangeably. . . . As a result, new groups have formed
with the idea that they would have to accommodate
foreign fighters into their ranks.73
71. Lorne L. Dawson, The Demise of the Islamic State and the
Fate of Its Western Foreign Fighters: Six Things to Consider (The
Hague: ICCT, June 2018), 2–3.
72. UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 16 July 2018 from the
Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions
1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated
Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the
President of the Security Council,” UN Digital Library, July 16,
2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3813209?ln=en.
73. Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani, “ISIS
in East Asia: Strategic Shifts and Security Implications,” RSIS
Commentary no. 090, May 11, 2017, (italics in original), https://
www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CO17090.pdf.
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By November 2017, after the loss of 95 percent of its
caliphate, ISIS still had more than three dozen wilayats,
or provinces, on three continents. Some were small. Some
were dormant. But all have been deadly. Many fighters
fleeing the caliphate were opting to travel to established
branches or wilayats in third-countries rather than
returning to countries of origin.74
It is reported that some foreign fighters who leave Sirte
[Libya], on the one hand are heading south to possibly
join the group Boko Haram and, on the other hand some
are going west to Tunisia.75

One of the wilayat mentioned above and other
regions, “including Libya, the Sinai Peninsula,
Afghanistan, Yemen, the Philippines and several
regions across Africa,” have the potential to become
the new Islamic State headquarters.76 If such a
contingency were allowed to happen, the Islamic
State or a newly updated form of the group would be
able to begin to reconstitute itself in a new safe haven
for the next phase of the ongoing radical Islamist
global insurgency.
Even with the many unknowns related to extremist
fighter migration from Syria and Iraq to lateral
battlefields, we can accurately state this phenomenon
presently represents a far greater level of concern to
the global security interests of the United States and
74. “ISIS after the Caliphate,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, updated January 8, 2018,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-after-the-caliphate-0.
75. Claudio Bertolotti, “Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters:
There and Back,” Osservatorio Strategico 19, no. 1 (2017): 55.
76. Colin P. Clarke, “Where Will ISIS Seek to Establish
Its Next Safe Haven?,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2018,
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/where-will-isis-seek
-to-establish-its-next-safe-haven-542967.

29

the US Army than Islamic State fighters returning
directly to our homeland.77 On one hand, we have less
than 150 individuals from this threat group who are
unaccounted for and who could potentially reenter
the United States, with no acts of domestic terrorism
by such fighters having been documented in the past.
On the other hand, we have thousands of foreign
fighters who may potentially seek to bolster Islamic
State enclaves throughout various regions of the globe.
Although many of these fighters may seek to fight until
the end in Syria and Iraq, and others have attempted or
will attempt to migrate back to various European and
Middle Eastern and North African countries not yet
engulfed in Islamic State insurgencies, a substantial
portion of these individuals will likely seek to engage
in lateral battlefield transfers. The establishment of
new Islamic State provinces and the reinforcement
of older ones with fresh fighters migrating into them
would result in more acts of terrorism as well, enabling
the groundwork for new insurgencies to form. New
insurgencies would represent a direct threat to US
interests and would perhaps require boots on the
ground, as has taken place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
and other locales.
The Special Case of Women and Children
About 14 percent of the foreign fighters and family
members—38 individuals—who traveled to Syria and
Iraq from the United States were adult females, a small
percentage of the estimated 4,761 women who reside
77. For an overview of initial American citizen involvement
with the Islamic State, see Robert Pape et al., The American Face
of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-Related Terrorism in the US, March 2014—
August 2016 (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, February 2, 2017).
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in the caliphate.78 Based on overall statistics related
to women and girls joining the Islamic State, many
of them were led to believe the caliphate would give
their lives meaning; others joined for pure excitement.
Teenage girls left in hopes of “marrying a ‘warrior.’”79
Upon arrival, both single and married women were
sent to stay at a “women’s house” until they were
married or the husband they traveled with “passed
his interrogation and completed his training.”80 The
age range for women and girls was typically between
16 and 24, but girls as young as 13 were found to be
seeking to travel to Islamic State-held areas in Syria
after radicalization.81 Women also traveled to Syria
and Iraq to join their husbands “or were motivated
by revenge for loss of their husbands or relatives.”82
As the conflict progressed and the Islamic State’s
propaganda machine strengthened, women and girls
“left their homes to marry jihadists, mostly foreign
fighters who they had found on the Internet, after being
convinced of the need to support the fighters and bear
their children to create conditions for the growth and
normal functioning of the new proclaimed caliphate,
as well as to contribute in women’s traditional roles in
78. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 14, 20.
79. Marije Meines et al., RAN Manual: Responses to Returnees:
Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families (Amsterdam:
Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence, July
2017), 21.
80. General Intelligence and Security Service, Jihadist
Women, 6.
81. Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western
Muhajirat of ISIS,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 7 (April
2015): 499.
82. Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat of
ISIS,” 499.
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jihad, like cooking or being nurses for soldiers.”83 But
living conditions were bleak, and, once the women
had arrived, leaving was difficult.
Roughly 4 percent of the US émigrés to
the caliphate—12 individuals—were identified as
minors.84 This percentage does not include any new
children born in Syria or Iraq to fighter and women
émigrés from the United States. Still, these numbers
pale in comparison to the 4,640 minors estimated to
reside in the caliphate.85 The five categories of children
residing in the caliphate are
1. those born to foreign fighters;
2. those born to local fighters;
3. those who had been abandoned and found their
way into ISIS-controlled orphanages;
4. those coercively taken from their parents; and
5. those who voluntarily joined the Islamic State.86
Depending on their location, one can estimate to
which category children likely belong. For instance,
“the children in training camps tend to be those
who have been taken from families or found in
orphanages,” and children in Islamic State-controlled
schools “tend to be those whose families volunteered
them.”87 Emigré minors from the United States
would likely be part of the first category. As part of
the grooming process, Islamic State fighters have
83. Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat of
ISIS,” 499.
84. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 20.
85. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 14.
86. Mia Bloom, “Cubs of the Caliphate: The Children of
ISIS,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs
.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate.
87. Bloom, “Cubs of the Caliphate.”

32

encouraged impressionable children to attend public
executions. Islamic State propaganda videos have
often shown children “pushing through the rows
of adults to reach a prime viewing position.”88 Such
indoctrinated youth become “cubs” and “pearls” of
the caliphate.
To be considered a cub of the caliphate, male
minors are subjected to training and conditioning by
Islamic State standards. At least 2,000 young males are
believed to have “undergone military training,” which
included “military and combat skills . . . [and] weapons
and explosives training . . . and which culminated in the
execution of prisoners.”89 Physical and psychological
conditioning is the Islamic State’s way of normalizing
violence and killings. These cubs are groomed to
be the future of the Islamic State. This process of
socialization is said to be composed of a six-stage
process: seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation,
specialization, and stationing.90 Currently, children
of Islamic State fighters are predominantly living in
Syrian encampments, either orphaned or with their
mothers, and are still being indoctrinated in Islamic
State ideology. Girls, known as “pearls,” can marry
at age nine under Islamic State law. Girls are brought
up to understand Islamic State ideology, “building the
Ummah, producing men, and sending them out to the
fierceness of battle.”91 Although neither noncombatant
88. Bloom, “Cubs of the Caliphate.”
89. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 34.
90. John Horgan et al., “From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage
Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State,” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 11–12.
91. Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, The Children
of Islamic State (London: Quilliam, March 2016), 45. See also
Islamic State, “To Our Sisters: A Jihad without Fighting,” Dabiq,
September 9, 2015.
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Islamic State women nor children generally pose a
direct homeland threat to the United States, they can
be viewed in many instances as auxiliaries to Islamic
State fighters, especially the cubs of the caliphate,
who represent protofighters and are of concern from
a lateral battlefield transfer perspective. The ability
of cubs to slip through security checkpoints easily as
part of refugee groups is a significant concern. Indeed,
techniques of faking one’s death on social media
accounts and losing passports and then claiming to be
someone else are common ploys.92
ISLAMIC STATE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
The Islamic State has four strategic options it could
presently be pursuing, the last of which represents the
most viable long-term strategic future for the group.93
The Islamic State has reverted to the previous version
of itself—the ISI writ large as a global insurgency—by
developing smaller groups or microcaliphates within
fertile regions characterized by porous borders, lack
of political capacity, and high levels of governmental
corruption. The group’s strategic options are
explored next.
92. See Anne Speckhard, Adrian Shajkovci, and Ahmet S.
Yala, “Following a Military Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq:
What Happens Next after the Military Victory and the Return of
Foreign Fighters,” Journal of Terrorism Research 8, no. 1 (February
2017): 81–89.
93. Additional outcomes and options exist; these outcomes
and options are the more probable ones and the most relevant
to the issue of extremist fighter migration. See Andrew Byers,
“Postscript: Islamic State Futures,” in Hammer of the Caliphate:
The Territorial Demise of the Islamic State: A Small Wars Journal
Anthology, ed. Dave Dilegge and Robert J. Bunker (Bloomington,
IN: XLIBRIS, April 9, 2018), 443–457.
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Strategic Option 1
Reestablish the Caliphate: As with any group after
it suffers major losses, the Islamic State still seeks to
regain power, which may prove to be an
insurmountable task. The group has lost a majority
of the finances it used to sustain itself, including
revenue from oil fields and taxes, and presently
cannot expect any windfalls from war booty. But
the Islamic State has been able to hang on “in part
because of conflicting priorities among the many local
and foreign troops fighting in Syria, which includes
Iranian forces patrolling parts of the Syrian Desert
and in areas where Russia has conducted airstrikes.”94
Nonetheless, US and coalition forces have successfully
pushed Islamic State fighters out of both Syria and
Iraq, and the fighters who remain are not strong
enough to reestablish the caliphate. In May 2018
alone, the United States “conducted 225 air strikes
on Islamic State positions—three times as many as
in March,” targeting specific positions where pockets
of fighters were located.95 Given that multiple states
are inside the conflict zone and air strikes persist, the
Islamic State territorially reconstituting itself would be
nearly impossible.
Strategic Option 2
Accept Loss of Territory and Go to Ground: The Islamic
State has not conceded defeat with the loss of the
caliphate. Maintaining attacks in Iraq and Syria
94. Sune Engel Rasmussen et al., “ISIS Remnants Fight
On, Despite US Campaign,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-remnants-fight-on-despite
-u-s-campaign-1531147121.
95. Rasmussen et al., “ISIS Remnants Fight On.”
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is enough for the group to signal that it is still
functioning—albeit as a wounded political-religious
entity. The Islamic State’s smaller groups operating
across the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia are
enough to convince the international community the
group has not necessarily lost territorial influence or
control in various regions. Furthermore, the Islamic
State’s online propaganda outlet, the Amaq News
Agency, continues to operate out of eastern Syria,
although in a weakened capacity.96 Additionally, the
Islamic State may still have hidden weapons and other
munitions in Syria and Iraq that US and coalition
forces have not yet unearthed. In Iraq, the Islamic
State maintains a presence through sleeper cells, with
fighters hiding in the desert regions of Al Anbar;
the Ghadaf Valley; and al-Hussainiyah, west of Ar
Rutbah.97 Down to only 2 percent of its former lands
in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State has increased hitand-run attacks and suicide bombings as it has shifted
to a postterritorial reality. Currently, too many armed
units—backed by devastating airpower and precisionstrike resources—have been deployed by too many
foes in these areas of operations for Islamic State
formations to hold ground effectively.
Strategic Option 3
Jihad against the West (and Russia): This strategic
option could be considered by returnees or individuals
radicalized at home who have the desire to launch
attacks from within the Western country in which they
reside. Individuals who have fought on the SyrianIraqi battlefield and have managed to return home
96.
97.

UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 5.
UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 7.
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successfully without arrest are capable of launching
internal attacks. For example, Abdelhamid Abaaoud,
the alleged leader of the November 2015 Paris
attacks, returned from a visit to Syria and recruited
a network of radicalized individuals in support of
this operation.98 Fighters already in Syria and Iraq
from Western countries are also able to recruit and
guide others online to “commit attacks in Western
countries without even returning home.”99 As such,
multiple homegrown attacks across Europe and even
the United States have been conducted by individuals
who have been radicalized online without having
ever visited the conflict zone. Maintaining the Islamic
State’s propaganda at some level is necessary to
continue the proselytization of sympathizers abroad
who may eventually launch attacks from their home
countries. Providing homegrown extremists with
veteran leadership via foreign fighter repatriation
represents a dangerous combination.
Strategic Option 4
Create Microcaliphates (Global Insurgency): The
Islamic State appears to be gravitating toward this
strategic option. This option promotes the creation of
regional microcaliphates within a global insurgency
strategy. Such microcaliphates are bound together
by allegiances between feudal war leaders. The
organization now represents a shifting hierarchical
and network-based entity with mixtures of directives
(direct control) and influence activities (indirect
control). This global Islamic State strategic approach
subsumes strategic option 2 (localized insurgency
98.
99.

UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 7.
UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 7.
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focused within Syria and Iraq) and draws upon
strategic option 3 (jihad in the form of terrorism
directed against the West) as a supporting substrategy.
The Islamic State has developed a substantial network
of affiliate groups outside of Syria and Iraq in parts
of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Afghanistan. This
branching out suggests the Islamic State has fully
readjusted its strategy from territorial state expansion
and is reverting to its roots as an insurgency, though
now fully on a macro level. This shift in strategic focus
is more in line with ongoing al-Qaeda strategies. This
shift in strategy will likely make al-Qaeda’s strategic
efforts redundant and may bring the two groups
closer to one another—though this is unlikely, given
the animosity between their respective leaderships.
The Islamic State’s weekly newsletter, Al-Naba,
“hinted at a major change of strategy in a series of
articles published between September and October
2017 on the topic of dealing with the US air campaign,”
and in an October 12, 2017 issue, the group suggested
it “had again been forced to switch to insurgency
tactics like in the spring of 2008,” referring to the
ISI.100 Hit-and-run attacks predominantly in Iraq and
increased suicide attacks in Syria are indicative of this
reversion.101 Next is an overview of the geographic

100. Hassan Hassan, “Insurgents Again: The Islamic State’s
Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria–Iraq Border Region
and Beyond,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 11 (December 2017): 5–6.
101. Hassan, “Insurgents Again,” 6.
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disposition of these regional microcaliphates and their
estimated strength (see table 3).102
Table 3. Islamic State global disposition of fighters
Regional Group
Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS);
Postterritorial Caliphate

Islamic State in Sinai;
Formerly Ansar Beit
al-Maqdis
Islamic State West Africa
Province (ISWAP); Boko
Haram components
Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara
Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant in Libya
Islamic State of Iraq
and
the
Levant—
Khorasan (IS-K)
Islamic State in the
Philippines (IS-P); Abu
Sayyaf components

State(s)
Syria, Iraq

Fighters (Estimated)
20,000–30,000 (Both;
July 2018)
15,500–17,100 (Iraq;
February 2018)

Sinai region of Egypt

Nigeria (Lake Chad
area), Chad, Niger,
Cameroon
Mali–Niger Border
Region
Libya
Areas of Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan
Philippines

13,100–14,500 (Syria;
February 2018)
1,000–1,500 (August
2018)
3,500 (April 2018)

400 (July 2018)
3,000–4,000 (July
2018 est.)
1,000–2,000
(Afghanistan;
December 2017)
200 (April 2018 est.)

102. Although other, lesser Islamic State regional groups
exist—such as those found in East Africa, Saudi Arabia,
Bangladesh, and Indonesia—they are viewed as not being of
sufficient strength to be able to presently engage in insurgency
operations. Since this research has been conducted, some new
works related to Islamic State foreign fighters and their estimated
numbers have appeared. These works include Daniel Byman,
Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2019); Sam Mullins, Jihadist Infiltration
of Migrant Flows to Europe: Perpetrators, Modus Operandi and Policy
Implications (New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2019); and Elena Pokalova,
Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters: Threats and Challenges to the
West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
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Regional Data
Middle East: Iraq, Syria, and Egypt
Since 2014, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
Inherent Resolve has worked in conjunction with
coalition partners to fight the Islamic State threat in
Syria and Iraq. For the second quarter of 2018, the goal
of the Operation Inherent Resolve campaign was to
“prevent ISIS from being able to hold key terrain and
influence major population centers, field forces that
can challenge the [Iraqi Security Forces] and coalition,
build external support networks, or expand influence
through information operations.”103
According to the August 2018 lead inspector
general report on Operation Inherent Resolve, violence
in Iraq declined in all but three provinces: Kirkuk,
Diyala, and Salah ad Din, all of which experienced
increased attacks along the “green line” that runs
along territory claimed by both the central government
and the Kurdistan Regional Government.104 Reports
from the UN estimate the number of Islamic State
fighters to be between 20,000 and 30,000, split almost
evenly between Iraq and Syria. The August 2018 lead
inspector general report agreed, estimating between
15,500 and 17,100 Islamic State fighters remain in
Iraq.105 The Department of Defense also estimated
between 13,100 and 14,500 Islamic State fighters are
in Syria, of which 4,000 to 6,000 remain in the US
103. Glenn A. Fine, Lead Inspector General Report to the United
States Congress: Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Pacific EaglePhilippines: April 1, 2018—June 30, 2018 (Washington, DC: Office
of Inspector General, DoD, August 6, 2018), 18.
104. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 3.
105. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 3.
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military’s areas of operation in northeastern Syria.106
But US operations against the Islamic State were put
on hold following the killing of Major General Qassem
Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Quds Force, on January 2, 2020. Efforts
transitioned to force protection in anticipation of
Iranian retaliation. Since the defeat of the physical
caliphate, the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and
the naming of new leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi
al-Qurashi, the Islamic State’s capabilities have not
been significantly degraded.107
In Egypt, the Islamic State in Sinai was previously
known as “Ansar Beit al-Maqdis,” which began as
an insurgent group in early 2011 during the Arab
Spring, shortly after Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow.108
In November 2014, the group changed its name to
Islamic State in Sinai when its leader’s pledge to Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi was accepted within three days.
The group has launched a series of attacks in the
region, “most notably claiming credit for the October
2015 downing of Russian Metrojet Flight 9268, which
killed all 224 passengers and crew members.”109 The
Islamic State in Sinai is estimated to have 1,000 to
1,500 fighters.110

106. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 42.
107. Glenn A. Fine, Lead Inspector General Report to the
United States Congress: Operation Inherent Resolve: October 1, 2019–
December 31, 2019 (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General,
DoD, January 31, 2020).
108. Jason Warner and Charlotte Hulme, “The Islamic
State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells across the
Continent,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 7 (August 2018): 23.
109. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 23.
110. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 23.
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Africa
Data on Islamic State fighters in Africa is limited.
Though not overtly engaged militarily in Africa,
the United States is directly working with partner
nations to prevent the Islamic State and other jihadist
cells from forming, as well as pushing against cells
currently in operation with ongoing drone and other
surgical strikes.111 In June 2018, Brett McGurk, former
special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS, said the United States and African partner
states will work as a “coalition to close facilitation
networks and transit routes running through Libya,
Sudan, and the Maghreb.”112 McGurk noted Islamic
State affiliates had “sprung from groups previously
affiliated with al-Qaeda, and other similar extremist
organizations.”113 Although the United States is
working indirectly, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
has already cut over 1,000 personnel from United

111. Special Forces teams have been deployed, and the
United States is in the process of building a drone base in Nigeria.
See Eric Schmitt, “A Shadowy War’s Newest Front: A Drone
Base Rising from Saharan Dust,” New York Times, April 22, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone
-base-niger.html.
112. Brett McGurk, “Remarks at the Political Director’s
Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” (speech, Political
Director’s Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Skhirat,
Morocco, June 26, 2018), https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-the
-political-directors-meeting-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat
-isis-2/.
113. McGurk, “Remarks at the Political Director’s Meeting.”
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States Africa Command posts, leaving about 6,000
troops and civilians in Niger, Somalia, and Djibouti.114
The most notable group affiliated with the Islamic
State is Boko Haram. In March 2015, Boko Haram’s
leader, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State, which acknowledged the pledge a few
days later. This new group became known as the
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which
operates in the Chad Basin region. But tensions
flared between the two groups by August 2016 over
ISWAP’s leadership.115 Shekau was replaced with Abu
Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Muhammed Yusuf, the
founder of Boko Haram. Barnawi is the current leader
of ISWAP, and Boko Haram officially rebranded as
ISWAP during the transition.116 In April 2018, the DoD
estimated ISWAP consisted of about 3,500 fighters, and
the group is believed to be the largest affiliate in terms
of fighters and territory, operating in the Lake Chad
region of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.117
The Islamic State Algeria Province started strongly
but quickly collapsed. The group was formed in
September 2014 by Abdelmalek Gouri, a former highranking al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib member.
The Islamic State Algeria Province became known
114. Michael M. Phillips, “US Weighs Troop Cuts in Africa,
Leaving Allies to Confront Growing Militant Threat,” Wall Street
Journal, March 15, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s
-weighs-troop-cuts-in-africa-leaving-allies-to-confront-growing
-militant-threat-11584291493.
115. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 22.
116. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 22.
117. Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud,
The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, R43612 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, September 25, 2018), 18, https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf; and McGurk, “Remarks at
the Political Director’s Meeting.”
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internationally after it kidnapped and beheaded
French hiker Hervé Gourdel as retribution for French
air strikes in Iraq.118 But Gouri had been killed by the
end of 2015, and the majority of the group’s members
were soon either arrested or killed.119 The Islamic State
Algeria Province was successful in recruiting al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghrib members and has launched
attacks in Jijel, Constantine, Tiaret, and the outskirts
of Algiers, Skikda, and Annaba. But the group is no
longer believed to be much of a threat, with strength
estimates of less than 25 fighters.120
The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, led by
Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, formed in May 2015.
Sahraoui was a senior al-Qaeda affiliate leader, but
his pledge to the Islamic State was not acknowledged
until October 2016. The group operates on the border
between Mali and Niger and is known primarily for its
October 2017 attack in Tongo Tongo that claimed the
lives of four US servicemembers and five Nigerians.
As of July 2018, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
was estimated to have a little over 400 fighters.121
Libya continues to struggle with the remnants
of the Islamic State. Islamic State cells first emerged
in Darnah in April 2014 “when a band of just 300
fighters—many of whom had returned from fighting
in Syria—returned to Libya and allied with members

118. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 22.
119. International Crisis Group, How the Islamic State Rose,
Fell, and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb, Middle East and North
Africa Report no. 178 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July
24, 2017), 22.
120. Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa,” 22.
121. UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 24.
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of pre-existing jihadi groups.”122 The Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant in Libya was officially recognized
in November 2014, and three branches were
established in the Libyan regions Cyrenaica, Fezzan,
and Tripolitania, with a total of about 500 fighters.123
By June 2015, the group had lost Darnah to al-Qaeda
affiliates, but the group subsequently gained the city of
Sirte. In mid-2016, the CIA estimated the Libya branch
had between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters.124 Currently, the
Islamic State has somewhat of a presence in Libya,
“abetted by the fluid security situation, some tribal
support and coordination with other terrorist groups
when expedient.”125 Specifically, cells are controlled
around “Tripoli, Misrata and Sabratah in the west,
with a substantial presence in southern Libya around
Ghat and Al Uwainat, and Ajdabiya and Darnah in
the east.”126 The group is still able to launch attacks
from the country with asymmetric tactics and the use
of improvised explosive devices. Present estimates
range between 3,000 and 4,000 fighters across Libya,
with the group’s central command located in the

122. UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 23–24.
See also Hasan Morajea and Erin Cunningham, “Libyan Gains
May Offer ISIS a Base for New Attacks,” Washington Post, June
6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east
/in-libyas-civil-war-the-islamic-state-shows-itself-as-the-main
-threat/2015/06/06/65766592-0879-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae
_story.html.
123. UN Security Council, Twenty-Second Report, 23–24.
124. Julian Hattem, “CIA: Undaunted ISIS is Expanding,
Focused on Attacking West,” Hill, June 16, 2016, https://thehill.
com/policy/national-security/283763-cia-says-undaunted-isisis-expanding-focused-on-attacking-west.
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“triangle between Bani Walid, southern Sirte and
Jufrah district.”127
Afghanistan
The Islamic State established a group in Khorasan
Province, the Islamic State of Iraq and the LevantKhorasan (IS-K), which covers parts of Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Formally established on
January 10, 2015, IS-K became the target of the Afghan
Taliban as a competing jihadist group. Experts credit
the group’s development to defections from smaller
groups across Afghanistan and Pakistan. The group’s
numbers increased as fighters fled Syria and Iraq and
some Afghan Taliban defectors joined. In addition,
some fighters from other militant groups, such as
Pakistan’s al-Qaeda-aligned Tehreek-e-Khilafat and
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, also joined.
The Islamic State enhanced its propaganda efforts
in Khorasan Province, particularly from Kabul to
Jalalabad and Peshawar. Afghanistan’s Nangarhar
Province had the greatest number of battles between
IS-K and the Afghan Taliban. The group claimed
multiple districts in which it had forced the Taliban to
retreat. The Islamic State affiliate has largely been an
intrusion and has impeded the Taliban’s effort to attack
US and Afghan forces. These actions have represented
a double-edged sword for the United States because
the Taliban represents a direct threat to governance in
Afghanistan, and the Islamic State is a greater global
concern. Current estimates indicate between 1,000
and 2,000 Islamic State fighters are in Afghanistan and
are continuing campaigns to further expand into the
northeastern part of the country, where the group is
127.
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currently active in the Jowzjan and Sar-e Pul Provinces
and Kandahar.128 The fighter estimates for IS-K are
rather small compared to estimates of the Islamic
State’s presence in Syria and Iraq, but IS-K is a prime
example of the Islamic State successfully carrying out
attacks and preserving its brand.
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia has no official Islamic State
branch or province, but multiple attacks have
occurred across the region since 2014, most notably
the 2017 Marawi siege (also known as the Battle
of Marawi) in the Philippines. A 2017 Combating
Terrorism Center report stated Islamic State attacks
in the region occurred “primarily in Malaysia (41%),
Indonesia (36%), the Philippines (17%), and Singapore
(6%),” with the majority of attacks occurring in the
Philippines (50 percent) and Indonesia (45 percent).129
The most recognizable Islamic State affiliate in the
region is the Islamic State in the Philippines (IS-P),
established in July 2014. Officials from the Department
of Defense, however, believe the IS-P is weak because
of its poor command and control and a lack of funding
from ISIS, which has been unable to support the group
since October 2017.130 Nonetheless, the Marawi siege
left a significant number of individuals displaced, and
sympathizers could potentially develop sleeper cells.
128. Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas, Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy, RL 30588
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 13,
2017), 20.
129. Marielle Ness, “Beyond the Caliphate: Islamic State
Activity outside the Group’s Defined Wilayat (Southeast Asia),”
CTC Sentinel 10, no. 6 (June/July 2017): 2–3.
130. Ness, “Beyond the Caliphate,” 14.
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United States Indo-Pacific Command officials estimate
the IS-P’s total force strength is approximately 200
fighters from different radical Islamist factions.131
Analysis
Although some extremist fighters have managed
to return to their countries of origin, others will
remain, which is likely because of their inability to flee
Syria or Iraq. A third category is the lateral transfer
of foreign fighters to other battlefields; however, no
hard data exists concerning such transfers. The overall
concern is returnees have some combat experience,
which they may use to commit acts of terrorism if they
reach home. Returnees who serve as influencers can
recruit others to launch attacks at home and radicalize
more potential members. For instance, nine EU states
reported a total of 205 foiled, failed, and completed
terrorist attacks in 2017.132 The United Kingdom
experienced the highest number of incidents—either
foiled, failed, or completed—at 107, followed by 54 in
France, 16 in Spain, and 14 in Italy.133 Although jihadibased attacks only represented a fraction of these
incidents, these types of attacks more than doubled
from 2016 to 2017, and they tended to have more
media impact.
The number of women and children returnees is
even more difficult to estimate, especially because of
the uncertainty of the nationality of children born in
the conflict zone. Many children were also exposed to
extreme violence and may even have been involved
in the fighting as cubs of the caliphate, making them
131.
132.
133.

Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 108.
EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2018, 9.
EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2018, 9.
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more dangerous. The involvement of children further
complicates the manner in which states will process
their returnees, or whether states will even consider
taking the returnees back.
Multiple countries have prevented foreign
fighters from returning home, limiting the spread of
fighters and the establishment of cells. For example,
Morocco has well-guarded borders—particularly in
the Western Sahara—and has deployed military and
law enforcement since 2014 to locations the country
believes could potentially be vulnerable.134 Algeria
has also been successful staying ahead of the Islamic
State threat with the use of military and other security
enforcements, including cybersecurity. In other
countries, US and coalition forces help by providing
continued air strikes or by assisting a state’s forces.
According to the latest numbers released by the
US military under Operation Inherent Resolve, the
coalition has conducted 24,566 air strikes across the
conflict zone to degrade the Islamic State and flush out
remaining fighters.135
Other forms of assistance include designating
groups as foreign terrorist organizations, which helps
other countries target the Islamic State. The IS-P
has been unable to regain strength since 2017.136 In
February 2018, the US Department of State designated
the IS-P as a foreign terrorist organization, followed
by a US Department of the Treasury sanction against
an IS-P financier in April 2018. Moreover, the United
134. International Crisis Group, How the Islamic State Rose, 24.
135. Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Muhammad
Al-`Ubaydi, “Burying the Lede: The Islamic State Downsizes?,”
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (website), July 20, 2018,
https://ctc.usma.edu/burying-lede-islamic-state-downsizes/.
136. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 46.
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States’ overseas contingency operation, known as
Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, supports the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in fighting Islamic
State sympathizers and the IS-P in the country. Since
September 2017, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines
has been supporting “the Philippine government and
military in their efforts to isolate, degrade, and defeat
ISIS affiliates and other terrorist organizations in
the Philippines.”137
In certain parts of Africa and the Middle East, the
Islamic State is maintaining its operational tempo;
this return to insurgency tactics is a viable means of
establishing smaller groups in vulnerable areas. See
table 4 for continued attacks by the Islamic State as of
July 2018.138

137. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 102.
138. All country information in table 4 is from “Crisis Watch:
July 2018,” International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup
.org/crisiswatch/july-2018. A note on Boko Haram: Whether the
attacks were perpetrated by the pro-Barnawi faction (ISWAP) or
the pro-Shekau faction, which continues to support Islamic State
Central, is uncertain.
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Table 4. Continued attacks by Islamic State
as of July 2018
Country
Libya

Egypt

Chad
Niger

Nigeria

Iraq
Syria

Situation as of July 2018
The Islamic State and other armed groups continue attacks
on civilians, especially in southern Libya. The Islamic State
weekly newspaper, Al-Naba, reported on July 6, 2018, the
Islamic State captured two air force officers in the Fezzan
region. On July 7, 2018, at a Tazirbu water plant, suspected
militants killed two workers and kidnapped two others.
Islamic State affiliates killed two policemen in Al ‘Uqaylah
on July 24, 2018.
Islamic State attacks continue in the Sinai Peninsula, even
as two Islamic State commanders reportedly surrendered
to security forces in Rafah in early July 2018. On July 3,
2018, the military stated three suspected Islamic State
militants had been killed in North Sinai. On July 11, 2018,
forces killed 11 Islamic State militants during a raid in Al
‘Arish and 13 others on July 24, 2018.
Boko Haram militants attacked a village near the Niger
border on July 19, 2018, killing 18 and kidnapping
10 women.
Suspected Boko Haram militants continue attacks in
the Diffa region in the southeast. The militants attacked
a military position on July 1, 2018, in Bla Brin village in
the Lake Chad area, killing six soldiers. Militants attacked
another military post in Baroua village on July 19–20, 2018,
near the Nigerian border.
Islamic State West Africa Province Boko Haram continued
attacks on military and civilians in Borno, Yobe, and
Adamawa states. In Borno, militants ambushed an army
convoy near Bama on July 13, 2018. Militants killed six
traders at Mussini village on July 17, 2018; at least 27 near
Gajibo village on July 18, 2018; at least 7 in a suicide attack
at a Konduga mosque on July 23, 2018; and at least 13 in
an attack on military in Jakana on July 26, 2018. In Yobe,
militants attacked a military base in Jilli on July 14, 2018.
In Adamawa, militants killed five civilians in Luru on July
10, 2018.
Islamic State attacks continue in Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah
ad Din Provinces.
Islamic State militants continue to carry out suicide
bombings. Multiple suicide bombings were reported on
July 25, 2018, in government-held As-Suwayda city and
against progovernment forces and civilians in nearby
villages, killing at least 200.
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The future migration potential of fighters is
difficult to assess. Estimates could include fighters,
family members of deceased fighters, or sympathizers
who have little to no combat experience.139 According
to the 2018 lead inspector general report, the Islamic
State “has not yet identified as an insurgency but
rather continued to see itself as a state with a standing
army.”140 The Islamic State is conserving forces “for an
insurgency that the Department of Defense predicted
would stretch across the desert in eastern Syria and
western Iraq, terrain that is well suited as a base for
guerilla warfare.”141 The group will have to “rely on
rural and desert insurgency in addition to urban
warfare to recruit members and ‘lay the groundwork
for a comeback.’”142 As of mid-2018, the Islamic State
has control of little territory in Syria; that which the
group does control is concentrated in “eastern Syria,
the Middle Euphrates River Valley, and rural areas
of southern Hasakah Province, as well as a third
pocket in the Yarmuk Basin in Dar’a Province south
of Damascus.”143 As General Joseph F. Dunford stated
in October 2017, the Islamic State is trying to “leverage
local insurgencies now to rebrand themselves” and to
maintain relevance.144 The Islamic State is achieving
this effect in places like Libya, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula,
139. Jeff Seldin, “Far from Dead: Tens of Thousands
of IS Fighters Linger in Iraq, Syria.” VOA News, August
13, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/far-from-dead-tens-of
-thousands-of-is-fighters-linger-in-iraq-syria/4527452.html.
140. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 46.
141. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 46.
142. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 46.
143. Fine, Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 45–46.
144. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “CHOD Conference Press
Briefing” (speech, Chiefs of Defense Conference, Fort Belvoir, VA,
October 24, 2017).
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and other parts of Africa. Migration patterns are
indicative of Islamic State fighters dispersing to areas
in which they can operate more freely, but the patterns
do not indicate a large number of fighters has flowed
out of Iraq and Syria.145
COUNTERBATTLEFIELD MIGRATION
POLICY RESPONSE
Battlefield migration response policies necessitate
that the foreign fighter threat be placed in context. The
datasets highlighted in the demographic overview
have a great degree of uncertainty because of the
use of different methodologies and both official and
unofficial statements. For instance, in 2015, the thendirector of the National Counterterrorism Center,
Nicholas Rasmussen, stated “more than 20,000 foreign
fighters” have traveled to Syria “from over 90 different
countries,” and “at least 3,400 of these fighters are
from Western countries.”146 In June 2016, then-director
of the CIA John Brennan told the Senate Intelligence
Committee in a rare public hearing the total Islamic
State fighting force was between 18,000 and 22,000,
which is lower than it was in 2015, when it had as
many as 33,000.147 The estimate of confirmed Islamic
State deaths further complicates the interpretation of
the available data. In July 2017, then-commander of
United States Special Operations Command General
145. Dunford, “CHOD Conference Press Briefing.”
146. Countering Violent Islamist Extremism (statement of
Rasmussen).
147. Patricia Zengerle and Jonathan Landay, “CIA
Director Says Islamic State Still Serious Threat,” Reuters, June
16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis
-fighters/cia-director-says-islamic-state-still-serious-threat
-idUSKCN0Z21ST.
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Raymond Thomas stated at a security forum, in
reference to the US and coalition forces, “we have killed
in conservative estimates 60,000 to 70,000 of [Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi’s] followers.”148 Assuming the estimate
is accurate and includes kills that have occurred since
the establishment of the caliphate in 2014, the number
of total Islamic State fighters is potentially higher than
the numbers that have been reported because the CIA
indicated up to 22,000 fighters had left by June 2016.
July and August 2018 reports by the UN and the lead
inspector general, respectively, claim the number of
Islamic State fighters has remained somewhat similar
to the numbers presented in previous reports—which
presumably also include foreign fighters.
Some of the specific issues related to the
discrepancies, gaps, and inconsistencies inherent in
these datasets and estimates are the following.
• The July 2017 figure of 60,000–70,000 Islamic
State fighters killed is potentially more than
twice the total estimated Islamic State fighting
force at its 2015 height of 33,000.149
• The Islamic State had lost 98 percent of the territorial caliphate by the spring of 2018, but is
estimated to have 20,000–30,000 (possibly even
31,100) members, which is roughly 60 percent

148. Raymond A. Thomas, “SOCOM: Policing the World,”
Aspen Security Forum 2017, July 21, 2017, transcript, https://
aspensecurityforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07
/SOCOM_Policing-the-World.pdf.
149. Thomas, “SOCOM: Policing the World”; and Zengerle
and Landay, “CIA Director Says.”
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to 94 percent of the estimated 2015 force during
its height.150
• Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) estimated
to have traveled to the caliphate range from
27,000–31,000, and possibly up to 41,490.151 Even
when the estimated 7,366 fighters and familial members who have returned to their countries of origin are factored in, 19,646 to 34,136 of
the estimated 2015 force equivalence of 33,000
are foreign fighters.152 These figures suggest
between 0 and 13,354 Islamic State fighters come
from Syria and Iraq, though the numbers do not
factor in post-2015 Islamic State fighter attrition
rates vis-à-vis later inflows. The zero amount
is of course an impossibility, showing the wide
inconsistencies in the estimates that exist when
checked against one another in an attempt to
understand the larger extremist fighter dynamics taking place.
• No reliable data or estimates exist of the numbers of Islamic State fighters recruited internally
from Syria and Iraq.
• No reliable data or estimates exist of lateral
battlefield migration by Islamic State extremist
fighters from the Syrian-Iraqi battlefield.
150. Islamic State membership in this estimate is only
partially fighter-based—the percentages of fighters and
nonfighters are not specified. Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate, Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist
Fighters, 2; UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 16 July 2018”; Fine,
Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, 3, 9; and Zengerle and Landay,
“CIA Director Says.”
151. The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters, 3; and Cook and
Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 14.
152. Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’, 15; and
Zengerle and Landay, “CIA Director Says.”
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These issues suggest policy responses related to
counterbattlefield migration are presently decoupled
from many of the extremist fighter demographic
estimates. Although certain datasets and estimates
may be accurate, the ones that are accurate and the
ones that are not are unknown.
The Extremist Fighter Threat in Context
Three conditionals exist that allow us to better
place the extremist fighter and familial-member threat
in the context of core US security interests. These
conditionals are the type of extremists of concern,
their commitment to the cause of the Islamic State, and
their geographical location. These conditionals and the
severity of the threat—indicated using a color system
in which red means “dangerous,” yellow means
“increased warning,” and green means “baseline
concern”—are representative of the underlying
potential for violent extremist action to take place.153
The conditionals and severities are as follows.
153. Issues of nonviolent extremism are also of great
importance, but they remain subordinate to concerns related
to violent extremism. Still, issues of nonviolent extremism are
being increasingly addressed and even viewed in some instances
as precursors to violent extremism. For background on initial
perceptions related to nonviolent extremism thinking and public
policy focused on radical Islamists in the United Kingdom, see
Theresa May, Counter-Extremism Strategy, Command Paper 9148
(London: Home Office, October 2015); and Theresa May, Forward,
Together: The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017
(London: The Conservative and Unionist Party, 2017), quoted in
Daniel Kirkpatrick, “Why Criminalising Non-violent Extremism
Won’t Prevent Terrorism,” The Conversation, June 13, 2017,
https://theconversation.com/why-criminalising-non-violent
-extremism-wont-prevent-terrorism-78973.
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• Extremist Type: Islamic State personnel residing
in Syria and Iraq can be categorized primarily
within three categories: fighters (who are primarily adult males), cubs, and wives and other
women who are of childbearing age. Fighters
are considered dangerous (red), cubs exist at
the warning level (yellow), and wives are considered benign (green) from a violent extremist perspective. As a note, not all adult males
are fighters. The Islamic State—like any large
terrorist or insurgent organization—requires
administrative personnel to properly function.
Fighters engage in violent extremism while
these other personnel—including most fighter
wives—facilitate violent extremism, rather than
actually engaging in it. These support personnel and leaders, however, cannot be considered
as solely engaging in nonviolent extremism
because they are accomplices to and managers of
violent extremism. A description of the personnel’s characteristics with caveats can be viewed
in table 5.154 The conclusions shown in the table
are from a combat and violence perspective.
Exceptions exist where women are armed or
engage in suicide bombings because approximately one in nine women who migrated to join
the caliphate may be classified as Islamic State
fighters. But, more often, women engage in
propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, and
materiel-support activities.
• Commitment: Extremist fighters and their family
members over time have varying levels of commitment to the Islamic State cause. The most
severe level, red, is reserved for those who are
154.

Adapted from Meines et al., RAN Manual, 6.
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considered operational in nature. These personnel actively engage in terrorist and insurgent
activities, which makes them the most dangerous in their commitment levels. The yellow
level in the commitment scale is composed of
individuals who have disengaged from jihad
and become inactive. Within this zone are foreign fighters who have returned home to seek
better living conditions for themselves and
their families after having been subjected to the
deprivations of living in Syria and Iraq.155 These
extremists continue to support Islamic State
tenants and represent potential sleeper units if
allowed to migrate back to the West. So, these
extremists are still of concern because they
remain radicalized and may at some point reengage in Islamic State activities. The green level
of commitment pertains to extremists who have
become disillusioned with or even remorseful
about the ideologies and policies of the Islamic
State and have begun the process of, or are at
least receptive to, deradicalization. These individuals have essentially sidelined themselves
from the war the Islamic State is waging, and,
for this reason, are considered at the baseline
concern level or potentially lower. These personnel may even prove to be useful tools in the
deradicalization of others.
• Location: Extremist fighters remaining within
the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields represent the
present baseline for US and Western allied security interests and are considered a lesser threat
to the US homeland. The fighters and their families who have laterally shifted battlefields—as
155.

Meines et al., RAN Manual, 7.
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long as they do not enter American, European,
and other Western homelands—are categorized
at a warning level of concern. Finally, fighters
and their affiliates who have returned to the
United States or other Western country of origin
or who have infiltrated these countries exist at
the most dangerous threat level because, at a
minimum, terrorist attack potential now exists.
Synthesizing these three factors—extremist type,
commitment, and location—provides a continuum of
threats, from the severe (red) to the baseline warning
(green), with a sequence of blended combinations
residing in the middle of this continuum (see table 6).
Table 5. Foreign fighter and familial extremists
Fighters
(Primarily Males)
• High risk
of combat
experience and
skills

Cubs (Young Males)

Wives (Females)

• Intense ideological
indoctrination
through education
and socialization

• Family role and
mother to future
soldiers

•Often involved
in and exposed
to war atrocities

• Recruited for combat
and other violent
activities from age
nine

• Variety of roles
within the
terrorist-held
territories
Combatants
Red (dangerous)

• Severely traumatized

Quasicombatants
Yellow (warning)

• Driven by sense
of empowerment
and their role
in building the
caliphate
• Involved in the
recruitment and
indoctrination of
children and others
Noncombatants
Green (concern)

Though outside the scope of this research, the
middle-range, blended combinations—such as
cubs (yellow), operational (red), lateral battlefields
(yellow)—may provide modeling preference utility
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for global counter-FTF activities related to recent
UN Security Council resolution 2395 (2017) and
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
reverse-flow focuses.156
Table 6. Foreign fighter and familial extremist
threat continuum
Fighters (red)

Wives (green)

Operational (red)

Disillusioned (green)

US-Western battlefields (red)

Iraq-Syria battlefields (green)

Severe threat

Baseline threat

156. The programs focused on foreign terrorist fighters
(FTFs) build upon UN Security Council resolution 2178
(2014), which criminalizes FTF-related activities in all states
acceding to the resolution. Rex Tillerson, “On the Adoption
of UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on Foreign Terrorist
Fighters” (speech, US Department of State, Washington,
DC, December 21, 2017); Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, “2018 OSCE-Wide Counter-Terrorism
Conference: The Reverse Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(FTFs): Challenges for OSCE Area and Beyond” (white paper,
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, May
10–11, 2018); and Matteo Pugliese, “The OSCE Counter-Terrorism
Conference: The Reverse Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,”
June 12, 2018, https://eeradicalization.com/the-osce-counte
-terrorism-conference-the-reverse-flow-of-foreign-terrorist
-fighters/. For background, see “Foreign Terrorist Fighters,”
UN, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist
-fighters/; UN Security Council, Resolution 2395, Threats to
International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts—CTED
Mandate Renewal, S/RES/2395 (December 21, 2017), https://
undocs.org/en/S/RES/2395%20%282017%29; and UN Security
Council, Resolution 2396, Threats to International Peace and
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts—Foreign Terrorist Fighters,
S/RES/2396 (December 21, 2017), https://undocs.org/en/S
/RES/2396(2017).
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Policy Response
Derived from the above threat context, the
counterextremist migration policy response should
first and foremost focus on the male fighters, and
then be scalable enough to also include their cubs,
and then their wives. Early pubescent females—
pearls—have no combat training regime equivalent
to the cubs of the caliphate. At best, pearls undergo
Islamic State indoctrination and, over time, have
had increasing commitment levels. This relative lack
of commitment means pearls should be considered
less of a threat than wives (who generally function
as noncombatants/support personnel) and placed
with very young (pre-cub) males, (pre-pearl) females,
and infants, all of whom exist in a protected category
under international law.
Though conditional variations will of course
exist, such as operational (red) cubs (yellow) being
considered more dangerous than disillusioned (green)
fighters (red), these classifications are not necessarily
a priori in nature, nor can they be easily determined
from observation alone.
Additionally, in formulating counterextremist
migration policies, two levels of targeting should
be undertaken: one applied toward the extremists
themselves and the other applied against the Islamic
State organization’s command and control and
network influence capabilities. As a component of
these policies, their potential for second-order effects
needs to be considered. The policy responses proposed
need to be weighed against the broader context of US
foreign policies focused on Syria and Iraq and UN
programs meant to globally address contemporary
FTF flows, as well as recommendations related to more
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strategically focused US Joint Force considerations.
The countermigration policies proposed as well as
their broader US and UN policy interfaces and impacts
are reviewed next.
Extremist-Focused Response Policies
These response policies should be considered
additive in nature. The policies are intended to
complement each other, with each policy meant to
facilitate the elimination of a threat component of
the demographic set of extremist fighters and their
families. In a sense, the policies follow a “render safe”
approach to mitigating the foreign fighter threat by
using elimination, containment, and related end states
to ensure Islamic State personnel remain in the Syrian
and Iraqi theater of conflict—or, if they eventually are
able to migrate, have been deradicalized before they
do so. These policy responses are as follows.
• Target and Kill in Place: This response is the
currently preferred Western policy and is specifically focused on foreign fighters who are
active combatants. Armed cubs and wives (as
well as single females) who possess deadly force
capabilities are also legitimate targets within
these rules-of-engagement protocols. Attacks
using precision-airdropped munitions, missile
strikes, and artillery fires are dominant means
of attack, but close-combat operations can and
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do take place.157 Well over 20,000 close-combat
attacks (defined as strikes and engagements)
have taken place in Syria and Iraq over the last
few years as Western coalition forces have targeted and destroyed Islamic State forces.158 Second-order effects: Fighters killed in battle achieve
martyrdom within the radical Islamist mythos,
and are thus considered by Allah as worthy
of the highest blessings of paradise. Although
small numbers of martyrs created within a radical Islamist organization provide morale benefits, large-scale fighter elimination likely has
the opposite effect. The danger of this form of
targeting is the collateral damage stemming
from indiscriminate attacks and resulting in
the injury and deaths of innocent bystanders.
Though one enemy may be killed, many other
new enemies are potentially created from the
families of those mistakenly targeted.
• Capture of Surrendering Personnel and
Hors de Combat: Islamic State personnel who
have surrendered to US and coalition forces
or who have been captured after being rendered incapable of armed resistance (hors de
combat) are representative of another policy
157. As mentioned earlier, an even more precise targeting
schema has been adopted by the French government. See Tamer
El-Ghobashy, Maria Abi-Habib, and Benoit Faucon, “France’s
Special Forces Hunt French Militants Fighting for Islamic State,”
Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/frances-special-forces-hunt-french-militants-fighting-for
-islamic-state-1496090116.
158. An analysis of these attacks during a three-month
period at the end of 2017—October through December—can
be found in Matt Begert, “CENTCOM Targeting of the Islamic
State,” in Hammer of the Caliphate, xxvii–xxxii.
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approach. A recent report from July 2018 states
US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces have
detained almost 600 FTFs.159 Jihadi wives and
cubs are also frequently captured in both Syria
and Iraq. Second-order effects: Unlike the closure
brought about by killing Islamic State fighters,
this policy approach is viewed as transitory
in nature—such captured enemy combatants
cannot remain prisoners indefinitely. Indeed, a
Guantánamo Bay–type detention facility, where
terrorist detainees are held in an ongoing state of
legal limbo, would not be politically feasible for
the United States to establish in Syria or Iraq—
nor should it be considered. Imprisonment
is a waypoint to trial and sentencing, which
results in acquittal, prison sentencing, execution, or repatriation into the hands of security
and police services in the individual’s country
of origin. Many of these Islamic State detainees
have been deprived of their citizenship and rendered stateless and are thus banned from being
repatriated to their countries of origin or to the
countries in which they had been residing.
• Deradicalize Fighters and Their Families:
Foreign Islamic State members who have been
159. These fighters are from over 40 countries, with about
40 fighters from Russia and about a dozen from Germany and
France. Ryan Browne, “US-Backed Syrians Holding Nearly
600 Foreign Fighters,” CNN, July 18, 2018, https://www.cnn
.com/2018/07/18/politics/syrian-allies-foreign-terrorists
/index.html. Total Islamic State fighter detainees may be as high
as 1,000 in Syria and 10,000 in Iraq. See UN Security Council,
Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL
(Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United
Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat,
S/2018/770 (New York: UN Security Council, August 16, 2018), 3.
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detained after being captured or sentenced
and imprisoned represent fixed audiences that
can be targeted for deradicalization. Different
deradicalization protocols and approaches will
be required for interfacing with fighters, their
wives, and their cubs. Consideration should
also be given to focusing psychological operations on remaining Islamic State field force remnants—similarly representing fixed audiences
because they reside in geographically limited
enclaves—to begin the deradicalization process
or induce them to surrender. Besides neutralizing the threat of extremists engaging in violence, some former Islamic State personnel who
are more secular in their ideological leanings,
such as former Saddam Hussein regime officers,
may be induced to become collaborators against
their former comrades-in-arms by means of
payments or other inducements. The deradicalization of fully indoctrinated Salafi-jihadists—
Islamic State true believers and apocalyptic
cultists—is a long and involved process and
may not be achievable in many instances. For
example, deprogrammers who are deradicalizing Salafi-jihadists cannot exist too far down
the radicalization continuum from where these
individuals reside; otherwise, the deprogrammers will have no ideological or religious legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects. Second-order
effects: Implementing this strategy has pitfalls
related to Islamic cultural sensitivity issues, the
matter of who would implement the strategy in
various regions of Syria and Iraq, and different
interpretations of traditional Sunni behaviors
and perspectives and their degree of extremism.
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• Physically Inhibit the Movement of Remaining
Forces: Islamic State personnel still in the field
should be isolated and channeled into increasingly smaller geographic areas. The intent is
to create rings of containment around the
personnel—initially by means of US and allied
fires and encircling coalition forces—so they are
unable to escape the remaining enclaves within
which they are operating. This strategy also
serves to fix the personnel in time and space,
which further allows them to either be targeted
and killed in place or captured and detained.
Containment rings established farther outside of
the enclaves in which the Islamic State members
are trapped are used as security checkpoints for
identification purposes so fleeing members can
be arrested. Technology is quickly advancing
to the point where automated facial-recognition systems can be loaded with Islamic State
social media imagery (pictures and videos) to
create datasets that may allow for Islamic State
personnel identification at checkpoints. Nevertheless, for the time being, security checkpoints
should be supported by biometric and facial
recognition technologies to facilitate the capture of better-known Islamic State members.
Inhibiting Islamic State financial support and
moneymaking opportunities would also further
serve to curtail the migration of extremist fighters. Second-order effects: Few downsides exist to
following this policy; however, the appropriate
Islamic State personnel countermove would
be to fall back, go to ground by breaking into
smaller and smaller groupings, and merge
into local refugee flows or find refuge in safe
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houses. At this point, the Islamic State fighter
threat begins to become more of a law enforcement matter.160 Unfortunately, such a physical
cordon creates black-market opportunities for
human traffickers. Safe passage into Turkey
has been quoted as costing $20,000–30,000 for
senior Islamic State operatives. Also, one trafficker boasted he had smuggled 50 Syrian and
foreign Islamic State fighters, often dressed like
women to bypass border patrols, into Turkey.161
• Psychologically Deter Outflow from Syria and
Iraq: In addition to creating physical impediments to Islamic State personnel movement
within Syria and Iraq, the psychological component of the extremists seeking to leave the
territorial ruins of the caliphate—either laterally to another battlefield or to their countries of
origin—should be targeted. This strategy would
require psychological operations to create a
deterrent to travel in the minds of Islamic State
members by convincing them conditions in
locations they seek to migrate to are even more
inhospitable than their present circumstances.
But, from an implementation perspective, so
many countries of origin exist that focusing this
message at specific nationals would be difficult,
as would getting the message to them in the
first place. For this reason, the message should
160. Greg Myre, “Where Did the IS Fighters
Go?,”
NPR,
January
1,
2018,
https://www.npr.org
/sections/parallels/2018/01/01/574967338/where-did
-the-islamic-state-fighters-go.
161. Eric Schmitt, “Thousands of ISIS Fighters Flee in Syria,
Many to Fight Another Day,” New York Times, February 4, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/world/middleeast
/isis-syria-al-qaeda.html.
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be tailored to nationals whose countries of
origin are in North America, Europe, and other
Western regions. Second-order effects: Amateurish attempts at such focused propaganda could
have the opposite effect, or, if the program is
successful, could drive more extremists into
Syrian regions controlled by the Assad regime
where more Islamic State safe havens exist.
Organization-Focused Response Policies
In addition to the policies discussed above, the
larger Islamic State organization should be targeted
with countermigration policies involving direct
and indirect control functions. (A debate existed at
one point on the centralized versus decentralized
organizational components of al-Qaeda, with Bruce
Hoffman advocating the importance of al-Qaeda
Central and Marc Sageman advocating a leaderless
and networked perspective.)162 The countermigration
policies would focus on the following.
• Disrupting Hierarchical Command and
Control: The Islamic State command-and-control element is centralized and traditional
in nature, like a hierarchical, industrial-age

162. See Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very
Private Feud over Terrorism,” New York Times, June 8, 2008,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview
/08sciolino.html. Both perspectives are accurate, with one form
of organizational structure dominating during some time frames
and in some locales and the other form dominating during and
in others.
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organization.163 This structure was particularly
evident after the caliphate was established in
mid-2014, with its headquarters in Al-Raqqah,
Syria. This Islamic State direct-control capability—while a legacy—still functions to
some extent, even with the death of Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi and while other senior leadership
remain at large. Targeting and disrupting this
command-and-control capability is required to
help degrade the organization’s ability to order
extremist fighter lateral battlefield migration
from Syria–Iraq to other regions. Second-order
effects: Further Islamic State devolution into a
more networked entity is the expected result of
this policy. Although this policy would not end
Islamic State terrorist and insurgency threats in
various regions of the world, it would eliminate
the group’s capacity to reconstitute a territorial
caliphate and direct centralized attacks as a projection of power to other regions of the globe, as
al-Qaeda undertook in the 9/11 attack upon the
United States via its safe haven in Afghanistan,
then under Taliban rule.
• Disrupting Network Influence: The other
component of Islamic State command and control is network-based and indicative of flatter
twenty-first-century organizations that have
increased information flows and quicker reaction and decision cycles than traditional entities.
163. Examples of the centralized organizational plan can
be seen in the Islamic State primary documents analyzed in
Christoph Reuter, “Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic
State,” Spiegel International, April 18, 2015, http://www.spiegel
.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of
-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html.
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Instead of direct-control oversight of the tasking of Islamic State personnel, this component
is related to influencing network and individual nodal behaviors. Islamic State networks
reside on numerous social media platforms and
applications, so achieving influence capability
is required across numerous cyberspace venues
to reach extended elements of the Islamic State
collective.164 Engagement in this domain would
require a cross-platform and cross-application
social media counternarrative campaign. This
campaign—conducted in multiple languages,
with an emphasis on English, French, and
German—would be directed at Islamic State
attempts to influence members of its affinity
grouping in Syria and Iraq to engage in lateral
emigration across globally dispersed battlefields or jihad within Western states. Technologies that may be used for such a campaign
include specialized software offering an “online
persona management service,” with which one
US servicemember could control up to 10 online
social media identities on the Web.165 Secondorder effects: This policy would further serve to
devolve the Islamic State—specifically its cyber
caliphate component—into numerous weak
and fragmented voices, instead of allowing it to
164. For instance, a network view of the Islamic State
Facebook collective can be found in Gregory Waters and Robert
Postings, Spiders of the Caliphate: Mapping the Islamic State’s Global
Support Network on Facebook (New York: Counter Extremism
Project, May 2018).
165. See Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US Spy
Operation That Manipulates Social Media,” Guardian, March
17,
2011,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011
/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks.

70

be unified by means of more encompassing narratives. One way to potentially achieve such an
end state would be to flood the multiple social
media venues used by the Islamic State network
with competing and contradictory messages.
For example, advanced generative bots that can
write 20,000 lines of online text a second would
be ideal for such a mission.166
Higher-Level US Foreign Policies toward Syria and Iraq
The proposed countermigration policies directed
at Islamic State members—fighters, cubs, and wives—
cannot be conducted within a foreign policy void
vis-à-vis US security interests in Syria and Iraq. The
policies must be deconflicted with, and would ideally
complement and support, US policies directed toward
the present geopolitical realities of those states. The
proposed foreign policy guidance is as follows.
• Continued
Limited
Cooperation
with
Authoritarian Regimes: One of the coordination issues related to countermigration policies
in Syria and Iraq is competing—and even hostile—entities, such as the various foreign state
and nonstate coalitions, each of which has a
certain percentage of the extremist fighter and
familial demographic set residing within its
operational areas of control. Given that Islamic
State narratives and actions have elevated the
group to the unenviable position of being the
enemy of all—even to its former allies al-Qaeda
166. See Douglas Haven, “The World’s Most Prolific Writer
is a Chinese Algorithm,” BBC News, August 29, 2018, http://
www.bbc.com/future/story/20180829-the-worlds-most-prolific
-writer-is-a-chinese-algorithm.
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and affiliates of al-Qaeda—some form of ongoing deconfliction and limited targeting cooperation with “the enemies of our enemies” to
further ensure extremist fighters cannot migrate
out of the region and ultimately can either be
eliminated or captured in theater should be
sustained. (The “enemy of all” statement may
be contested in that Islamic State funding—at
least in the past—is alleged to have come from
donors in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and, in
many instances, Turkey has engaged in questionable policies toward the Islamic State.)167
The fact that, as these cooperative activities are
taking place, each individual entity and coalition is jockeying to maximize its own relative
position against each other should not be forgotten. Also, ethically and legally, the United
States cannot engage in any form of cooperative efforts, even limited ones, with authoritarian regimes if, by doing so, war crimes or other
atrocities may result.
• Containment of Iranian and Russian
Influence in Syria: Such containment would look
to balance against both Iran and Russia, while
ensuring the Islamic State threat is still firmly
addressed. This policy would include “deterring
Iranian forces and militias from pushing close
167. See, for instance, Martin Williams, “FactCheck Q&A: Is
Saudi Arabia Funding ISIS?,” 4 News, June 7, 2017, https://www
.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-qa-is-saudi-arabia
-funding-isis; “Fighting, While Funding, Extremists,” New York
Times, June 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19
/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isis-terrorism.html; and Ahmet S.
Yayla and Colin P. Clarke, “Response: Turkey’s Double ISIS
Standard,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2018, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2018/04/12/turkeys-double-isis-standard/.
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to the Israeli border, disrupting Iranian lines of
communication through Syria, preventing substantial military escalation between Israel and
Iran, and weakening Shia proxy forces,” as well
as “deterring further Russian expansion in the
Middle East from Syrian territory and raising
the costs—including political costs—of Russian
operations in Syria.”168 At the same time, this
approach recognizes the requirement to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State or the rise
of another jihadist group such as al-Qaeda or
its affiliate, the Al-Nusrah Front.169 The current
perception is the Syrian civil war has de facto
been won by the Assad regime because it has
not been defeated. The regime is now in the process of regaining many of its former territories
following the resumption of its despotic, dynastic rule, which is grudgingly preferred—by the
United States and its coalition—to Islamic State
suzerainty. Although liberal-democratic control
of all Syrian territories is ideal, this end state is
not presently achievable with Russian forces on
the ground protecting their client state.
• Mitigation of the Effects of Iraqi
Fragmentation: The state of Iraq is increasingly devolving into three sectarian zones, with
the Shia population clustered from the center
toward the east, the Sunni population clustered
from the center toward the west, and the Kurds
concentrated within the northwestern region.
This devolution has been exacerbated by Shia
domination of the political process for the
168. Seth G. Jones, Developing a Containment Strategy in Syria
(Washington, DC: CSIS, May 2018).
169. Jones, Developing a Containment Strategy.
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branch’s own self-interests, Kurdish empowerment due to increasing autonomy related to
the group’s militarization and territorial gains,
and Sunni population linkages to the Islamic
State—especially via former personnel of the
Assad regime. State fragmentation in Iraq
would create new institutional voids in the state
within which the Islamic State could begin to
reconstitute itself. Although the United States
should attempt to shape the Iraqi political landscape, it only has a limited capacity and will
to do so. Prudence suggests the United States
should continue to back the Kurds via the presently existing patron–client relationship while
attempting to interface with and cultivate the
support of the nonradicalized Sunni populations. Attempting to influence the Shia populations has been and will continue to be difficult,
even more so now that Iranian influence is
extremely well entrenched. Whether pressing the Iraqi Shia leadership to offer concrete
political and economic goods to address Sunni
concerns and feelings of governmental alienation can at this point be realistically achieved
is unknown. If the fragmentation of Iraq should
someday come to pass, the Islamic State should
not be allowed to fill the security voids in the
geographic seams between the three competing
sectarian elements of that nation.
Counter-Foreign Terrorist Fighter Programs
The UN counter-FTF programs seek to stop
the flow of FTFs into states—typically at states’
borders (though also via international aviation
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security-screening standards). The US Army War
College KSIL tasking focuses primarily on stopping the
outflow of Islamic State extremist fighters (and their
cubs and wives) from Syria and Iraq.170 The counterFTF programs and the KSIL tasking can and should be
thought of as front- and back-end policy approaches
to an important international security concern.
Extremist countermigration policy coordination and
deconfliction issues related to the FTF programs are
as follows.
• Countermigration Policy Interfaces and
Overlaps: Policy and implementation seams
and overlaps will exist between the proposed
front-end policies and the preexisting back-end
programs that are geographic in nature (those
taking place in Syria and Iraq vis-à-vis a multitude of internally focused initiatives) and that
differ in terms of the national authorities and
regional coalitions participating in them. The
front-end policies are military-focused ones set
in foreign operational environments. The backend programs are security services and law
enforcement ones set in domestic environments.
Liaison will thus be required between United
States Central Command and the appropriate
UN bodies—composed of various directorates,
working groups, and teams in coordination with
the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force, which is composed of 38 international
170. The 2014 counter-FTF implementation plan includes
FTFs from the Islamic State, the Al-Nusrah Front, and other
al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. Given the far larger numbers of
Islamic State FTFs (and their familial dependents), the KSIL
tasking has an increased focus on the members of this terrorist
organization, though the tasking could also be applicable to the
Al-Nusrah Front and other al-Qaeda affiliates.
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entities—to ensure these efforts work in concert
with one another.171 Specific functional areas of
countermigration policy related to coordination
and deconfliction include deradicalizing, physically inhibiting travel, targeting Islamic State
financial support and moneymaking opportunities, psychologically deterring migration,
reintegrating into society captured personnel
who have been released or who have served
their prison sentences (especially if they are
stateless), and disrupting direct (hierarchical)
and indirect (network) organizational control.172
Joint Force Recommendations
The US Joint Force has four specific
recommendations related to extremist fighter
migration and the inherent threat potential that
results from such migration. These recommendations
are based on both higher-level, strategic, and
complementary considerations. The recommendations
are as follows.
• Review and Validate Datasets and Estimates:
The discrepancies, gaps, and inconsistencies
171. See “The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force (CTITF),” UN Victims of Terrorism Support Portal, https://
www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/en/about/ctitf.
172. For thoughts on Islamic State financial trajectories,
see Patrick B. Johnston and Colin P. Clarke, “Can the Islamic
State Survive Financially?,” Lawfare, May 14, 2017, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/can-islamic-state-survive-financially.
One component of Islamic State financial targeting is now being
coordinated by means of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center.
See US Department of the Treasury, “US and Saudi Arabia to
Co-Chair New Terrorist Financing Targeting Center,” May 21, 2017,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages
/sm0092.aspx.
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encountered when researching the Islamic
State and foreign extremist fighters are causing
immense levels of confusion. Individual datasets and estimate information appear valid;
however, when they are cross-checked, the
integrity of the numbers quickly becomes dubious because of contradictions and discrepancies
between them. Information voids exist with no
reliable numbers or estimates available related
to Islamic State fighters recruited in Syria and
Iraq or lateral battlefield migration out of the
former lands of the caliphate. A comprehensive
review of the datasets and estimates related
to Islamic State foreign and extremist fighters
is recommended—as well as the filling in of
information voids—so baseline numbers can
be generated and validated in support of Joint
Force activities to avoid wasting resources in
unproductive areas.
• Islamic State Expansion into New Provinces:
The demise of the territorial caliphate has
resulted in multiple strategic options—or countermoves—being available to the Islamic State.
The group foresaw the need for such strategic
countermoves once it entered the caliphate’s
decline-and-fall era by August 2016, if not prior.
The new dominant strategy the group is following is that of microcaliphate creation as a component of a greater global insurgency. Islamic
State COAs related to the development and
expansion of the new provinces—representative
of these microcaliphates—should be analyzed
by the Joint Force. Such analysis would include
future lateral battlefield migration options once
the new provinces and the most likely COAs
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had been established. These activities should be
studied in depth by means of gaming, simulation, and strategic red teaming efforts.
• The Demise of the Territorial Caliphate:
Al-Qaeda, just like the Islamic State, is being
subjected to the second- and third-order effects
resulting from the demise of the territorial
caliphate. New pressures on al-Qaeda will
present themselves, as will new opportunities
for the group. One line of thought is al-Qaeda
and its affiliates have greatly benefited from
the military attention of the United States and
its allies on the Islamic State. As an outcome,
al-Qaeda has replenished its ranks, with some
32,200 to 44,200 extremist fighters now globally
deployed—a larger estimated force than that
presently possessed by the Islamic State. Indeed,
according to Bruce Hoffman, “ISIS can no longer
compete with al-Qaeda in terms of influence,
reach, manpower, or cohesion.”173 On the other
hand, the Islamic State has now become a direct
global-insurgency competitor to al-Qaeda in
its new strategic manifestation. These circumstances beg the questions: Over time, will the
Islamic State take over more and more of the
radical Islamist (Sunni) global insurgent market
from al-Qaeda? Will al-Qaeda be able to dominate this niche area successfully? Or will some
sort of equilibrium be reached, with a dual organizational insurgency ensuing? The Joint Force
should also engage in al-Qaeda postcaliphate
COA analysis by means of gaming, simulation,
and strategic red teaming efforts.
173. Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection,” March 6,
2018, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection.
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• Update the Unified Command Plan (UCP):
The UCP is “a classified executive branch
document prepared by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and
updated every two years that assigns missions;
planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities
to [combatant commands].”174 The components of the UCP that strategically coordinate
counter-Islamic State and counter-al-Qaeda
efforts across the geographic and functional combatant commands should be updated now that
a postterritorial caliphate exists.175 The update
would benefit from the three Joint Force recommendations previously discussed. Further,
all-of-government counterterrorism considerations must be better aligned with the UCP, the
2017 National Security Strategy of the United
States, and the subordinate National Strategy for Counterterrorism released in October
2018.176 Of concern is the radical Islamist threat
has morphed over the course of roughly two
decades from a singular al-Qaeda global
174. Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and
Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, R 42077
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2012).
See also “Unified Commands, CENTCOM & Components,”
United States Central Command, http://www.centcom.mil
/ABOUT-US/COMPONENT-COMMANDS/.
175. Feickert, Unified Command Plan; and “Unified
Commands, CENTCOM & Components.”
176. See Donald J. Trump, A New National Security Strategy
for a New Era (Washington, DC: The White House, December
2017); and Donald J. Trump, National Strategy for Counterterrorism
of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House,
October 2018).
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organizational threat into a contemporary,
dual, al-Qaeda and Islamic State global organizational threat. Although describing this situation as “one Hydra head getting hacked off and
two growing in its place” may be premature,
victory over the radical Islamist threat remains
virtually elusive. This problem should at least
cause some strategic reflection—and, possibly,
reevaluation—on the part of the United States,
given that it, now 19 years beyond 9/11, is $2.8
trillion deeper in national debt as a result of its
response to the attacks.177

177. Aaron Mehta, “Here’s How Much the US Has Spent
Fighting Terrorism Since 9/11,” Defense News, May 16, 2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/16
/heres-how-much-the-us-has-spent-fighting-terrorismsince-911/.
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